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Abstract 
 
Shrinking budgets and dynamic military conflicts have driven Department of 
Defense (DoD) leadership to reform how the military acquires weapon systems with the 
goal of decreasing program schedules and costs, while maximizing performance. Yet 
with more than fifty years of acquisition reform, the DoD has been unable to adequately 
control program schedule objectives. Previous research attempted to support acquisition 
reform through computer modeling and simulation. One model, called the Enterprise 
Requirements and Acquisition Model (ERAM), captures a program’s progression through 
the Defense Acquisition Management System (DAMS) to gain insight into significant 
delays that impact a program’s schedule and probability of completion. A past 
unexpected result included the insignificant impact that Developmental Test and 
Evaluation (DT&E) activities had to a program’s overall schedule. This ERAM research 
improves the fidelity of the Air Force (AF) DT&E activities through data collection, 
subject matter expert (SME) feedback, computer modeling and simulation, and Monte 
Carlo analysis. Interventions included modifying the probability of passing the Test 
Readiness Review, System Verification Review, decreasing the maximum delay to a 
program’s first test mission, improvements in Responsible Test Organization resource 
availability, test item quality, and test item quantity. Several interventions significantly 
reduced major program schedule by 15% or 21 months. The research demonstrates a 
methodology for quantitatively supporting acquisition reform interventions by 
characterizing key DT&E activities and delay factors. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
 The political and economic environment the United States (US) found itself in 
during the beginning of the twenty first century forced the Department of Defense (DoD) 
to research new methods to improve the processes by which the US military acquires its 
weapons systems. The ability to observe system level impacts of acquisition reforms 
could assist leadership in making reforms which not only have local process benefits, but 
positively impact the entire system. This thesis focuses on refining previous research 
efforts in an attempt to provide Air Force (AF) senior leadership a different capability to 
assist in addressing acquisition reform. 
General Issue 
 As technology advanced during the 21st century, it was integrated into military 
weapon systems increasing the time required to produce them. Efforts to evolve an 
effective acquisition process culminated into the 2008 DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02 
which was the official instruction on conducting DoD acquisitions and is summarized in 
the Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Life Cycle Management 
System Chart in Figure 1. Pending modification to DoDI 5000.02 have been proposed at 
the time of writing this thesis (USD, 2013). 
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Figure 1: DoD Acquisitions (DAU, 2013)  
As complicated as the weapon systems being obtained, the process to acquire 
these systems can be viewed as equally complex. DoD leadership formally acknowledged 
problems with how the military produces weapon systems in the Hoover Study conducted 
in 1949 and since then over 128 acquisition studies have been conducted (Kadish, 2005). 
Even with over 60 years of evolution, the acquisition process has not consistently 
performed at an acceptable level (Eide, 2012). From a recent Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) report, programs in the 2012 acquisition portfolio were on average more 
than two years behind schedule (2013). The consistent findings in many similar reports 
combined with the economic crisis the US found itself in during the beginning of the 
twenty-first century has captured senior DoD leadership’s interest in acquisition reform. 
Both President Obama and Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Hagel have addressed the 
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issue. President Obama expressed his concern, that the US could no longer afford 
acquisition’s poor performance and must become more efficient in delivering weapon 
systems to the warfighter (Obama, 2009), by signing into law the Weapons System 
Acquisition Reform Act in 2009. The President’s viewpoint was supported by SECDEF 
Hagel’s who expressed his concern during a speech at the National Defense University in 
2013.  
“We need to continually move forward with designing an acquisition 
system that responds more efficiently, effectively and quickly to the needs 
of troops and commanders in the field. One that rewards cost-effectiveness 
and efficiency, so that our programs do not continue to take longer, cost 
more, and delivers less than initially planned and promised.”  
Problem Statement 
Joseph R. Wirthlin investigated the Defense Acquisition Management System 
(DAMS) for complex relationships which could be causing emergent behaviors within 
the system. Wirthlin postulated that acquisition reform may have been implemented 
without the ability to accurately predict system impacts due to these complex 
relationships. Wirthlin (2009) recognized the opportunity for research in this area and 
became the focus of his dissertation. His research created the Enterprise Requirements 
Acquisition Model (ERAM), an extensive simulation model of the DAMS. The purpose 
of ERAM was to investigate the DAMS process relationships in order to characterize 
how the system worked, why it behaved the way it did, and if there were ways to improve 
it. ERAM provided the capability to simulate policy reforms in the simulation model and 
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observe the system impacts. Due to the complexity of the DAMS, many low level 
processes were purposefully abstracted. Wirthlin discovered several unexpected results in 
his dissertation and suggested them as areas for future research including: the Test 
Readiness Review (TRR), Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E), and System 
Verification Review (SVR) activities (Wirthlin, 2009: 189-190). These three areas will be 
the focus of this thesis. 
Investigative Questions 
The following questions were identified for this thesis:  
1. How can the fidelity of ERAM 1.0 DT&E activities be improved? 
2. What insight can be gained from the improved fidelity ERAM with regard to 
supporting previous research conclusions regarding the TRR, DT&E, and SVR 
activities? 
3. What DT&E process interventions can significantly reduce program schedule? 
Impacts 
The ability to simulate acquisition policy reform in a simulation model and 
observe system level impacts, before implementing the policy in reality, could be useful 
to DoD leadership. ERAM is not viewed by the author as a tool for DoD leadership to 
directly use to make reforms. Rather, ERAM is viewed as a demonstration of how 
computer modeling and simulation could be utilized to support acquisition reform. With 
adequate resources, an advanced model, similar to ERAM, could be developed to as a 
tool to support quantitative-based acquisition reform through computer modeling and 
5 
simulation. Lastly, ERAM could also be an educational tool for the Defense Acquisition 
University to assist in teaching future acquisition professionals about the complex 
relationships between process, technology, people, and the resulting emergent behaviors.  
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II. Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
Chapter II is divided into several sections: Modeling and Simulation Overview, 
ERAM, ERAM Evolution (2010-2013), DT&E’s Role in Program Schedule Delays, and 
Literature Synthesis. The first section provides a brief introduction of modeling and 
simulation focusing on its advantages, disadvantages, and limitations. The chapter will 
continue with an in-depth review of the previous ERAM research. The Other Acquisition 
Modeling Efforts section will be review other similar research projects. Chapter II 
concludes by synthesizing key concepts from the extant literature.   
Modeling and Simulation Overview 
From automobile factory production lines to shipping distribution centers, these 
collections of processes can be viewed as systems. Often there is desire to improve some 
aspect of system performance such as decreasing production line down time or cycle 
time. However, for complex systems, it may be difficult to estimate the impact changing 
local variables will have on the entire system. The most direct way to observe system 
impacts would be to implement the change in the actual system. This method is generally 
not used because of the feasibility and potential financial loss should such a change result 
in unintended negative consequences. Another method is to utilize modeling and 
simulation. “A simulation is an abstraction of an operation in a real-world process or 
system over time” (Banks, 2005: 3).  Coupled with the computational capabilities of 
computers, modeling and simulation enables system analysis difficult, if not impossible, 
to attain from any other method. For example, in a simulation model, performance results 
7 
are directly traceable to changes the experimenter executed in the system. If acquisition 
reform was instead executed in the DAMS in reality, it would be difficult to correlate 
system improvements to the implemented reform because of the multitude of policy 
reforms consistently enacted on a monthly basis. Figure 2-3 each presents a three year 
timeline of DAMS reform implementation.  
 
Figure 2: New DAMS Policy Reforms by Organization 2008-2011 (Milam, 2012) 
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Figure 3: Number of DAMS Policy Reforms from 2008-2011 (Milam, 2012) 
The constant process change may result in a state of causal ambiguity where 
policy reforms and system improvements are difficult to correlate with one another. In 
addition, long DAMS program cycles would require years of observation before adequate 
sample sizes are collected. With computer modeling and simulation, time is less of a 
limiting factor as it can be manipulated. Data representing hundreds of years can be 
collected in a few hours. Collecting the same information by observing the reality is 
impossible.  
As powerful as modeling and simulation can be, it should only be used in certain 
situations. Four situations, directly relatable to this research project, are discussed below 
(Banks, 2005: 4): 
1. “The goal of the study or experimentation is the interactions of a complex system or 
of a subsystem within a complex system.” 
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• ERAM may be viewed as an investigation to characterize a complex system 
(DAMS) and understand what impacts the subsystems ( DT&E activities) had 
on the overall system (Wirthlin, 2009). 
2. “The knowledge gained from a simulation model could be used to suggest 
improvements in the real system.” 
• ERAM investigated interventions to identify process improvements which 
could result in improved system performance in reality.  
3. “Changing simulation inputs and observing the resulting outputs could produce 
valuable insight into which variables are the most important and how those variables 
interact.” 
• One of the main goals of ERAM and this research project was to observe what 
changes in the system would result in system schedule performance benefits 
(Wirthlin, 2009). 
4. “Many modern systems are so complex (automobile factory, wafer fabrication plant) 
that the internal interactions cannot be understood without the use of computer 
simulation.” 
• Over sixty years of acquisition reform has failed to create a system which 
adequately controls program schedule. This result may be, in part, due to the 
system’s complexity hinting at the requirement to utilize computer simulation 
to better characterize the system and its emergent behaviors.  
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ERAM 
ERAM is a discrete event simulation model of acquisition category (ACAT) I, II, 
and III which attempts to capture the “idea” of a program in pre-Milestone A all the way 
to Milestone (MS) C. Included are the functional areas of the Joint Capabilities 
Integration Development System (JCIDS), Acquisitions, the Planning Programming 
Budgeting & Execution (PPBE), and Contractors. Created through investigation of 
official policy and refined by SMEs, a single program progresses through the model. 
Through Monte-Carlo analysis and the stochastic nature of the model, thousands of 
potential outcomes are characterized to create a distribution of program schedule and 
probability of successfully navigating DAMS up to MS C.  
Validation of Arena Model 
Model validation was conducted by comparing ERAM results to historical data. 
Data were collected primarily from the System Metrics and Reporting Tool (SMART). 
Student t-Tests compared ERAM results to the historical data. Specifically, the program 
time from MSB to MSC, for different ACAT groups (all ACATS, ACAT I, ACAT II, 
and ACAT III), was analyzed. Hypothesis testing indicated that ERAM was a valid 
representation of the DAMS for all ACAT categories at a 95% confidence level 
(Wirthlin, 2005: 138-146).  The validation results of ERAM are important because they 
will enable validity of this research project discussed in Chapter III.    
 
11 
ERAM Evolution (2010-2013) 
 Since 2009, other researchers have realized the potential benefits of utilizing 
ERAM to investigate DAMS. These include work by Leach and Searle (2010), 
Montomery (2011), and Baldus and others (2013). Below is a summary of their research 
efforts.  
Table 1: Overview of ERAM Research Projects 
Author Year Version Number 
Simulation 
Program Changes 
Wirthlin 2009 ERAM 1.0 Arena Baseline translation from Arena to ExtendSim 
Leach and 
Searle 2010 
ERAM 
1.1 ExtendSim 
Updates by the Aerospace Design Team and 
served as new baseline model 
ERAM 
1.2 ExtendSim Implemented new DoD 5000.02 policies 
ERAM 
2.0 ExtendSim 
Incorporated the global variables that modify 
acquisition capabilities  
ERAM 
2.1 ExtendSim Incorporated JCIDS review process 
Montgomery  2011 ERAM 2.2 ExtendSim 
Added more capabilities for ACAT II/III and 
Rapid Acquisition Process 
Baldus and 
others 2013  2.4 ExtendSim Integrated space launch process delays 
 
ERAM Research Vectors 
Two research vectors were identified when reviewing the research in Table 1. The 
original purpose of the ERAM was to improve understanding of how the DAMS operated 
in order to conduct system level improvements. This research vector can be categorized 
as improving system schedule performance. Since 2009, the focus shifted from system 
schedule performance to prediction of a single program’s schedule. Figure 4 provides a 
summary of previous ERAM research and their respective vectors. 
12 
 
Figure 4: ERAM Research Vectors 
 None of the projects listed in Table 1 addressed the DT&E areas of concern 
identified by Wirthlin which presented the opportunity to proceed with either research 
vector. The author was advised to “Go where the research interest is” by the research 
committee and the author queried the acquisition community for input. Discussions with 
SAF/AQXC, OUSD/ AT&L, and DAU indicated that the system schedule improvement 
vector would be more relevant and directed this research project to investigation of the 
DT&E activities in the original ERAM (ERAM 1.0) for the purpose of acquisition system 
reform.  
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Other Acquisition Modeling Efforts 
Acquisition Document Development Model (ADDM) 
 Senior DoD leadership identified one problem in government acquisitions was 
the lack of document control and listed seven document control issues (ASC/RCC, 2010: 
2): 
1. Milestone dates delayed due to non-timely document preparation.  
2. Creating documents consumes a large amount of time and resources.  
3. The rationale in tailoring program documents is not captured in a formal way.  
4. There is no strong linkage between program documentation. 
5. The quality and content is inconsistent across a program’s documents.  
6. There is no capability to support cross-cutting changes to acquisition documents 
with minimal effort. 
7. A lack of insight into Milestone readiness  
These issues were found to be especially prevalent when a program changed Program 
Manager’s and were approaching a MS review. The AF created an interactive model, 
called the Acquisition Document Development Model, capable of tracing program 
documents and processes to address this issue. The four ADDM objectives were 
(ASC/RCC, 2010:4): 
1. Provide a roadmap that identifies what documents are required and when based 
on a program’s ACAT level and MS. 
2. Provide the ability for a PM to modify the program’s document roadmap to 
meet specific program requirements.  
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3. Provide a set of validated document templates which are linked to current 
guidance, references, and Program Executive Officer (PEO) specific 
instructions 
4. Provide a quick, visual indicator on program review and Milestone document 
status. 
The intent of ADDM is to provide PM’s with document situational awareness 
through several key model features. One such feature was that ADDM created a unique, 
customized document roadmap based on the acquisition program’s ACAT level and the 
next MS. Another feature was ADDM automatically created a set of standardized and 
validated document templates according to the program’s roadmap. Each of these 
documents was linked to the current policy and instruction. As a program progressed 
through acquisitions, ADDM captured decisions and updated the program’s roadmap and 
documents as required. In addition, ADDM was continuously updated to ensure the most 
relevant information was accessible to PMs.   
ADDM, as shown in Figure 5, provides PMs a tool, to assist in moving the 
program from the current situation to the next MS review, listed the documents required 
at the next MS review, provided standardized templates for documents, updated 
document status, and provided current document guidance and instruction. Future plans 
for ADDM include the addition of DoD space and business systems roadmaps.  
15 
 
Figure 5: ADDM (ASC/RCC, 2010: 8) 
Acquisition Process Model (APM) 
The DAMS can be viewed as a complex system of processes and the ability to 
guide a program through the processes is critical to success. In 2009, the AF Acquisition 
Chief Process Office initiated a project to create an official, authoritative process model 
of the DAMS. The Acquisition Process Model was the culmination of their efforts. APM 
provides an interactive process model for ACAT I programs from the point of view of the 
Program Executive Officer (PEO) covering the DoD 5000 instruction, the JCIDS, and the 
PPBE  activities. APM’s goal is to provide a standardized, authoritative acquisition 
process model with six objectives (ACPO, 2011):  
1. Establish standard definition and activities associated with AF acquisition. 
2. Provide process decomposition from Defense Acquisition Executive/Service 
Acquisition Executive through PEO level actions. 
3. Provide an integration context for other external/related process models. 
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4. Provide the process input to Acquisition Enterprise Architecture and other 
Enterprise Architectures. 
5. Provide a standard reference model for all stakeholders. 
6. Provide a common context for process improvement initiatives. 
APM utilizes an interactive model to capture document and process relationships 
placing additional emphasis on the requirements generation (JCIDS), acquisitions (DoDI 
5000.02 series), and funding (PPBE) activities. Key information (including process 
definition, owner, reference document, performer, and links to current documentation) is 
available for each process as shown in the APM preview in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: APM Developmental Test (ACPO, 2011) 
APM is updated on a routine basis to incorporate the current policies. Future plans 
include improving model fidelity to the PM level processes.  
17 
Requirements and Acquisition Management Plan (RAMP) 
Space system acquisition is different from conventional acquisitions in many 
aspects as discussed in Air Force Instruction 99-103. However, space acquisition also 
suffers from similar schedule problems observed in conventional acquisitions. The Air 
Force Space Command’s Directorate of Requirements (AFSPC/A5) investigated the 
space acquisitions and identified that quality and speed of requirements generation are 
critical areas of concern (Gilchrist, 2011:24). AFSPC/A5 chose to use modeling as a 
method of investigating these problems and created the Requirements and Acquisition 
Management Plan.  
The goal of RAMP is improve the requirements generation and acquisition 
processes through a “standard, consistent, and transparent” requirements and acquisition 
management process (Gilchrist, 2011:3). RAMP is a work breakdown structure tailored 
for acquisitions which provide users the ability to schedule activities, assign 
responsibilities, and access activity relationships. Figure 7 shows an example the RAMP 
model.  
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13
Process:  RAMP Work Breakdown 
Structure
hyperlink
notestask begun
<= 30 days until task start
task late task complete
> 30 days to start
task tailored out
DEFINING OUR FUTURE IN SPACE AND CYBERSPACE  
Figure 7: RAMP (Gilchrist, 2011:13) 
Literature Synthesis 
Chapter II provided several insights. The first insight was that modeling and 
simulation are capable of providing insight into understanding complex process (DAMS) 
when utilized appropriately. However, there are disadvantages inherent in all models and 
the corresponding results must be analyzed by modeling and simulation experts who 
understand these limitations. Another insight was that there are different methods (system 
dynamics, agent based modeling, interactive charts, and other options) to model a system 
and each method can provide a different viewpoint. All the research projects discussed in 
Chapter II were modeling the same system but from different viewpoints. The different 
methodologies were driven by the type of problem each model was addressing. The 
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ADDM approached acquisition reform from a documents control perspective in order to 
bring PMs situational awareness and control over the multitude of documents required 
during procurement. APM provided PEOs a standardized, validated, and traceable model 
of the DAMS processes. Requirements issues were addressed by RAMP through an 
integrated, work schedule structure in order to decrease the requirements generation 
schedule and increase quality. The DAMS suffers from diverse problems of which only a 
very small sample were discussed here. However, as diverse as the problems encountered 
were, a commonality among these research projects is that they used modeling as a 
method for investigating a complex system. 
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III. Methodology 
Methodology 
A simulation study methodology was utilized for this research. See the Appendix 
for a figure of the methodology. The first step was reviewed in Chapters I and II. Chapter 
III will address data collection and the iterative process of building a simulation model 
and verifying the model. The remaining steps are addressed in Chapters IV and V. 
Data Collection 
There are two fundamental modeling constructs utilized in ERAM: processes and 
decisions. Processes are tasks which take a stochastic amount of time to accomplish and 
are modeled using triangular distributions. Decisions represent reviews where an entity 
may progress through different model paths. Figure 8 contains graphical representations 
of the two constructs encountered in ERAM. This area of ERAM was constructed with 
three process blocks (represented by the rectangles) and a decision block (represented by 
the diamond). The lines connecting the blocks represent the possible paths from one 
process or decision to another and identify how an entity could progress through the 
model. The model logic (in Figure 8) is from read left to right. A program (the entity) 
enters the “Developmental Test and Evaluation” process block and a random number 
from a triangular distribution will be randomly selected representing the time required to 
perform the process. Next, the program progresses to the “Trades Needed” decision block 
which will direct the entity to either the “Dev test rework and delay” or “Early 
Operational Assessment” block based on the random value compared to a percent true 
criteria. A program not requiring any rework will take the path around the “Dev test 
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rework and delay” block (not incurring a delay due to accomplishing the blocks process) 
and proceed to the “Early Operational Assessment” block. In this block, the program will 
incur another process delay as specified by random number chosen from the block’s 
distribution.  
 
Figure 8: ERAM Systems Engineering Activities (Wirthlin, 2009: 318) 
Triangular Distributions  
All ERAM processes, relevant to this research, are populated with triangular 
distributions as shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9: Task Block Triangular Distribution 
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Defining a triangular distribution requires definition of a minimum, mean, and maximum 
value.  This type of distribution was utilized because SMEs were easily able to estimate 
the minimum, mean, and maximum time required to complete a process based on their 
personal experience. All the processes and activities relevant to this research project were 
constructed from SME opinion. If real data could be collected, it could increase the 
validity of ERAM. 
Historical Data  
Historical schedule data for ACAT I, II, and III programs were desired for 
validation purposes. The Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval 
(DAMIR) and SMART databases were identified by SMEs as possible sources of the 
desired data. The author’s request for DAMIR access was denied but SMART access was 
granted.  Unfortunately, the author experienced technology problems with the SMART 
application and no data was collected. Data from Wirthlin’s research on program 
schedule times from MS B-C were available and utilized. Test mission data and factors 
which resulted in cancelations, aborts, test mission effectiveness, and other metrics were 
received from a Major Range and Test Facility Base (MRTFB). The test mission data 
were imported into Microsoft Excel in order to construct model probability inputs of 
categorical factors identified during the SME discussions. The test mission data are 
labeled “For Official Use Only” (FOUO) and are not included in this research paper. If 
the reader would like a copy of the data, please contact a member of the research team 
whose contact information is provided in the Appendix. 
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SME Discussions 
 Purposeful sampling was utilized to select possible SMEs who were familiar with 
the DT&E activities. These individuals were contacted through phone calls and email. 
Semi-formal discussions were conducted between the author and SMEs who were 
available to participate in the research. A list of general discussion topics can be found in 
the Appendix. If the SME was in the local area, the author conducted the discussion in 
person at the SMEs office. If the SME was not local, the discussion was conducted over 
the phone with supporting documents provided through email. Although a predetermined 
set of topics were utilized to initiate and direct the discussions, conversations were 
allowed to deviate. SME answers were transcribed on paper by the researcher. At the end 
of the discussion, SMEs was asked to provide contact information for any additional 
references that may be able to provide additional information or have interest in this 
research. This proved to be a very useful technique and how a majority of the SMEs were 
identified.  
The discussions with SMEs were the most enlightening source of knowledge for 
this research. Issues only hinted at in literature were discussed frankly without the need 
for political correctness allowing a different perspective of DT&E. The next few pages 
will present quotes from SMEs which were particularly enlightening and relevant to this 
research.  
Almost all of the SMEs identified unrealistic schedule expectations as the most 
common and significant source of DT&E program delay. Poor quality estimates were 
mentioned to originate from both the SPO and DT&E communities.  Several DAU SMEs 
discussed how this trend may be linked to official policy that is not always as cohesive or 
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direct as required in regard to dealing with planning for problems. “Policy does not direct 
planning for a problem. We plan for success with minimum schedule” commented one 
SME. Interestingly, the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) directly addresses this 
observation (2012: 52):  
“Experience indicates that most programs use a success based timeline when 
planning the integrated program schedule, meaning that each event or activity is 
based on positive results and moving to the next activity or phase of the 
acquisition effort. Experience also indicates that this concept is a major fault in 
most program planning.”  
 
Another issue is the limited number of test resources available. The following quotes 
reveal how a limited number of test resources (test personnel and dedicated test aircraft) 
can cause interdependencies between test programs and outside organizations (not a 
DT&E organization) negatively impacting schedule.  
  “We are constantly trying to find qualified test personnel. It is forcing me 
to borrow people [from other test organizations] in order to execute my 
own tests. Now my test is dependent on whether or not someone outside 
my organization is available. Luckily, we have a pretty good relationship 
with those organizations and they are in the same boat as us. They help us 
when they can and we do the same.  However, I’ve been here long enough 
to know it is not always like that.” (RTO SME)  
 
“We don’t own our test aircraft. When we want to execute a test we have 
to coordinate with the ops guys to get one of their birds. Sometime our 
tests last a few weeks and we need the aircraft the entire time. But they 
have a mission to do as well. They don’t want to give up a bird for that 
long and they own it so if they don’t want to or need it for something else, 
we don’t test unless the test is important enough that we start climbing the 
chain [of command] and get one of them to set the priority. It’s a constant 
struggle. And when we do get one, they don’t give us their best aircraft, 
they give us the one that is having maintenance issues. So now I’m 
fighting maintenance issues while trying to execute test.” (RTO SME)  
 
“The RTO gave us a schedule estimate about a year out. Problem was we 
ended up a low priority program and we were constantly fighting for range 
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time which we never got. It took longer to get done than we first thought.” 
(SPO SME) 
 
The next quote reveals how acquisition leadership can encourage negative 
behavior. Although not directly a process issue, it reveals how acquisition reform 
will have to address cultural issues in addition to process reform.  
“We try to plan for bad things to happen, but when I take that padded 
schedule to senior leadership, I get punched in the face for planning for 
failure so I take it out or try to hide it in other places. Funny thing is, when 
bad things do happen, I get punched in the face by the same leadership 
because my schedule slipped.” (SPO SME) 
 
 Another common theme discussed with several of the DT&E SMEs was poor test 
item quality resulting in unplanned, additional work to fix and test the configuration 
changes. There were two aspects identified: initial test item problems which occurred 
before test execution and test item deficiencies discovered during test execution. The next 
quote discusses how many test items are brought to the RTO in less than optimal 
conditions and how schedule may be impacted.   
“The reality is when a customer comes to us with a poor test item and we 
find problems, we don’t just give it back to them and tell them to fix it on 
their own and bring it back. That doesn’t help the customer or the 
warfighter. So we find the problem, then fix it, test it, then we find another 
problem, we fix that problem, then test that problem, and this goes on until 
we finish. It is not the most efficient way to execute test because we end 
up spending a lot of time fixing and testing the problems we find. Is it our 
[DT&E community] fault that the test item was of poor quality? No. The 
customer brought us a bad test item to begin with. We are merely the 
messenger of bad news and they [the SPO] are trying to shoot the 
messenger.” (DT&E SME) 
 
“If we are consistently finding problems with the test item, 90% of the 
time the program is behind schedule, over budget, or both.” (DT&E SME) 
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The DAG states “Although T&E is best managed as event-driven, in most cases it 
is not practical in practice” (DAG, 2012: 52). Several SMEs supported the DAGs 
observation. 
“Test should be event driven, but in reality we do not always follow that. 
Especially with larger programs, the SPO comes to us and tell us how long 
we have to test. Right now I am fighting with the **** program because 
they gave us *** months to test. I really need *** months to adequately 
test this system. The truth is we will test what we can test in that time, find 
and fix as many of the deficiencies as we can, and the SPO will hope that 
we don’t find any big issues that delay the program. As for the less 
important deficiencies, most will just get fixed along the way. Sometimes 
though, one will get buried or carried to the next phase of testing. The 
program has the support and need to push its way through. But when they 
give me half the time I need to properly test the system and its gets pushed 
through to OT, is it really our fault that problems are discovered in OT 
that we would have found had I been given the time I requested?” (DT&E 
SME). 
 
When the SME indicated that deficiencies were buried, clarification was requested.  
“We only find deficiencies and report them. It is up to the SPO to decide 
whether or not to fix them. For really big problems, the SPO will fix these 
because they can be show stoppers. But for smaller problems that don’t 
seem to have a large impact on the system, sometimes they are played 
down as unimportant, do not get fixed, and are swept under the rug as 
unimportant. However, later in OT the problem surfaces, only this time the 
OT guys think it’s a big problem and are upset with us [RTO] because we 
didn’t find the problem. Well, truth is we actually did find it and reported 
it, but the SPO downplayed or hid it because they didn’t want to spend the 
time or money to fix it.” (DT&E SME) 
 
One SME postulated that the location of DT&E in the acquisitions cycle may be a 
source for delay. Located at the end of a program’s life cycle, by the time the programs 
arrives at DT&E, any delay potentially planned for and built into the schedule has been 
utilized in other phases of acquisition and must have unrealistic performance results in 
order to finish on time. In the AF, generally the RTO will direct what testing needs to be 
accomplished and is supportive of more thorough testing (which takes time and costs 
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money) while the SPO must balance cost, schedule, and performance objectives which 
rarely allow for thorough system testing. The SPO and RTO objectives are contentious 
and can result in a hostile relationship between the SPO and DT&E community. 
“Test falls in a poor location on a programs schedule. Program schedules 
are planned and approved sometimes years in advance and they [SPO] try 
to take into account schedule delays. They lay it out and it all looks nice 
with plenty of time for everything. But then there is a problem with 
manufacturing, the software is late, and then something else takes longer 
to fix than anticipated. All these eat up schedule and if it takes too long it 
eats schedule from somewhere else. By the time the program gets to test 
all that padding is gone, the money is tight, and they hope nothing goes 
wrong. I see hope as a risk management strategy way too often.” (DT&E 
SME) 
 
SME Demographics 
The SMEs that participated in this research were required to have experience in 
either the System Program Office (SPO) or DT&E community. Unfortunately, 
individuals in the SPO community with PM experience and interest in participating 
proved to be challenging as they tended to be higher ranking individuals, busy, and a 
majority politely declined to participate. It is worth noting that at this particular point in 
time the government shutdown of 2013 had just concluded. Had this event not occurred, 
interest from the SPO community may have been greater. Regardless, two SPO SMEs 
with PM experience participated in this research. The response from the DT&E 
community was more positive and consisted of the majority of SME demographics. 
These individuals were GS-15/ Lieutenant Colonel and below personnel. In total, eleven 
SMEs participated in this research which included active duty/ retired Army and AF 
officers, DAU professors, RTO test conductors, SPO managers, and RTO test directors. 
The experience ranged from over twenty-five years of acquisition experience (one of the 
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PMs) to four years (for a RTO test conductor). All SMEs had spent time executing test, 
one had written AF test policy, three were DAU T&E professors, and three had worked 
in a program office. Many of the individuals were identified through snowball sampling. 
SME Discussion Summary  
 The SME discussions brought to light several issues which may contribute to 
DT&E program delays. Initial schedule estimates are created and approved long before 
test execution occurs which may not be representative of the program once it reaches 
DT&E. SPO estimates appear to be overly optimistic possibly due to senior leadership 
cultural issues. For those programs that do plan for delays, the estimated delay is still 
optimistic due to problems encountered early in the acquisition lifecycle which supports 
overly optimistic DT&E schedule. RTO estimates are based on current organizational 
manning and resource conditions which may not be representative of the future state at 
the time the program arrives at DT&E. In addition, substandard test item quality may be 
forcing the RTO to execute a suboptimal test management methodology (fly, fix, fly) 
with limited resources in order to provide the warfighter a system of limited capability 
sooner rather than a perfect solution later. Unfortunately, differing opinions on what 
deficiencies require additional schedule to address can be motivated by the good intention 
of getting a weapon system to the warfighter as soon as possible but at the risk of 
overlooking or missing a critical deficiency. These observations originate from a small 
sample population of the acquisition community, with a majority originating from the 
DT&E perspective, and do not necessarily represent the general consensus of the 
acquisition community. Even if the opinions presented here represent a sound basis of the 
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acquisition community, they are purely subjective in nature. A quantitative method of 
analyzing DT&E activities and delays was required.   
DT&E Conceptual Model  
The knowledge obtained from the Chapter II was utilized as a foundation to 
identify critical DT&E activities and significant delays for creation of an initial 
conceptual model. The author’s initial intent was to create a one-one process model, 
modeled at the PEO level of abstraction, with simulation capabilities. A breakthrough in 
creating the conceptual model came during review of the APM. As mentioned in Chapter 
II, there were several similarities between the APM and ERAM including that both 
modeled the AF DAMS processes. The major difference between the two models was 
APM was a process model which did not have simulation capabilities. Realizing the 
potential to transform APM into a simulation based model, the initial plan was to utilize 
the APM as an initial starting point to build a simulation model of the DT&E processes.   
The author chose to model from a top down approach supported by Banks 
(2005:14). Based on the APM, the DT&E processes and their relationships to other 
acquisition processes were identified and assembled into a conceptual model.  Several 
challenges were encountered during the course of creating a conceptual model due to the 
software ERAM was created in and ERAMs graphical size. None of the SME had access 
to Arena software and due to ERAM’s size and complexity, it was impractical to transfer 
the design onto common software found on government furnished computers. This 
supported creation of a conceptual model in Microsoft Visio which all the SMEs had 
access to. After the first conceptual model was created, discussions with SMEs were 
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accomplished to check the model’s validity. During the discussions, it became apparent 
that a majority of the conversations were focused on processes and interactions not 
displayed in the conceptual model of this research but contained in other areas of ERAM. 
After several iterations of refining and verification of the model with SMEs, the size and 
complexity of the conceptual model increased to the point there was concern if the 
research project would finish on schedule.  The research scope was narrowed to only 
focus on DT&E execution activities. In addition, the majority of the research project 
delay was attributed to verifying the process model. However, a process model was not 
required to answer the investigative questions and seen as replicating Wirthlin’s original 
work, the author chose not to structure the simulation model as a process model. This 
approach was supported by the idea that “It is not necessary to have a one-to-one 
mapping between the model and the real system. Only the essence of the real system is 
needed” (Banks, 2005: 14). This decision simplified the model considerably. A figure of 
the conceptual model is available in the Appendix. Several iterations of SME discussions 
and modifications to the model were required in order to arrive at a general consensus 
that the model reasonably represented the system in reality. At this point, the conceptual 
model was considered to have face validity.  
DT&E Simulation Model 
 The conceptual model was translated into a simulation model in the Arena 
software separate from ERAM 1.0 in order to decrease verification and simulation run 
time. The separate model is referred to as the DT&E Model (DTEM). Several iterations 
of model building, inputs from SMEs, and refinement were conducted resulting in the 
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final DTEM version as presented in Figure 10. A detailed description of the model is 
available in the Appendix.  Chapter IV will assess model validity and investigate DT&E 
activities and delays through interventions to assess activity/ delay significance at the 
system level.  
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Figure 10: Final DTEM 
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IV. Analysis and Results 
DTEM  
Assumptions 
 Several model assumptions were required for model abstraction and 
simplification of several concepts and activities. ERAM 1.0 assumptions were 
incorporated into DTEM for consistency and model integration purposes. The most 
relevant ERAM 1.0 assumptions were: the entity passing through the model is a program 
which can be represented by an ACAT dependent number of required test missions and 
there are no memory effects in the model (Wirthlin, 2009: 148-149). DTEM assumptions 
were constructed with input from SMEs and are listed below: 
• Backup missions are executed the same day as the primary mission. In reality, 
backup test missions are not necessarily executed on the same day as the primary 
as a risk management technique. 
• A single backup mission is planned for every primary mission. In practice, 
depending on the criticality of a test mission, several backup missions could be 
scheduled. However, this assumption simplified the model while still capturing 
the intent of backup missions.  
• Each test mission is independent of any test missions.  
• If a test mission is more than 60% effective, it will not execute a backup mission.  
• At least one and no more than five days of testing will occur each week. 
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• The historical test mission data utilized in constructing the DTEM are valid 
representation of the reality. Three SMEs (collocated at the MRTFB where the 
test mission data were collected) discussed how the test mission data are purely 
representative of the people who report the data and the process may incentivize 
reporting optimistic values or conducting unorthodox behavior to improve 
organizational performance statistics. 
“If we have an aircraft problem early in the day, maintenance will push the 
test mission right hoping that there will be bad weather in the afternoon. If 
weather occurs, then maintenance will cancel the test mission which now gets 
labeled as a weather cancel when it was really a maintenance cancel” (DT&E 
SME) 
 
This behavior could potentially skew the data and model results. However, the 
average data values utilized in the model were discussed with DT&E SMEs, from the 
same MRTFB where the test mission data was collected, who did not observe any 
gross abnormalities. 
DTEM Verification 
Verification of the DTEM model was accomplished through several of Arena’s 
built in verification capabilities. When executing a simulation, Arena will ensure all 
blocks in the model are appropriately connected, populated with parameters, and defined. 
If any of these conditions are not met, Arena will display an error window identifying the 
category of error and location. The model cannot be executed until all issues are 
corrected. Arena also has the capability to display variables, processes, statistics and 
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other categories as a group in a single spreadsheet. This allows for easy verification that 
all items have the correct units, logical expression, or parameters. In addition, the user 
may display values for variables/ statistics while stepping through the simulation. By 
utilizing animation and displaying the current value variables at each step in the 
simulation, the user can observe the simulation progress, verify the models mathematical 
logic, and ensure the reports generated at the end of the simulation were displaying the 
correct values. If an anomaly occurs during the simulation run (such as division by zero) 
Arena will terminate the run and display a warning window identifying the type, time, 
and location of the issue. Several iterations of model refinement and calibration utilizing 
the techniques discussed were required before the model would run error free with no 
unusual results or observed behavior. At this point the model was verified.    
DTEM Validation 
 No historical data for ACAT DT&E schedules were available for this research. 
However, historical data from Wirthlin’s research regarding program schedule from MS 
B-C were available and utilized once DTEM and ERAM 1.0 were integrated. Two 
aspects of validation are presented: face validity of DT&E execution time, ERAM 3.0 
MS B-C time.  
DTEM Face Validity 
DTEM exports data files of user specified system performance parameters and 
ACAT time spent in test execution. These data were imported into Microsoft Excel 2007 
and analyzed using Excel’s Analysis Tool-pack. Histograms and descriptive statistics 
were compiled (Figures 11-15) and presented to SMEs who reviewed the results 
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providing confidence in model face validity. SME feedback on the DTEM results was 
positive. The comments ranged from “They look good” and “The histograms look 
realistic considering all of the variables that come into play” to “The histograms do seem 
to tell a story.” Based on the comments from SMEs, DTEM results were considered to be 
a representation of reality accrediting DTEM with face validity. The next step was to 
integrate DTEM into ERAM 1.0 and statistically compare ERAM 3.0 (the integrated 
DTEM and ERAM 1.0 model) to the historical data gathered from Wirthlin’s research.  
 
 
Figure 11: DTEM ACAT I Schedule  
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Figure 12: DTEM ACAT II Schedule 
 
Figure 13: DTEM ACAT III Schedule 
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Figure 14: DTEM Effective Test Mission Growth 
 
Figure 15: DTEM Average Number of Effective Test Missions Executed in One Day 
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ERAM 1.0 and DTEM Integration  
Integration efforts provided confidence that no unintended configuration changes 
occurred in merging ERAM 1.0 and DTEM. While creating DTEM, ERAM 1.0 interface 
boundaries were investigated starting with identification of ERAM DT&E activities and 
their operations within the model. The DT&E activities of interest are contained in the 
red system boundary in Figure 16.  
 
Figure 16: ERAM 1.0 DT&E Activities 
Discussions with Wirthlin were conducted to verify the block and variable 
operations and how they could potentially impact integration efforts. Exploratory runs 
with adjusted activity distributions were conducted on ERAM 1.0 in order to increase 
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confidence in their relationships and operations. The final integrated model, ERAM 3.0, 
replaces the blocks contained in the red system boundary in Figure 16 with a single, 
hierarchical block labeled “DTEM.” 
ERAM 3.0 and ERAM 1.0 Analysis 
The program time spent in DT&E activities for ERAM 3.0 and ERAM 1.0 were 
analyzed. Details of the analysis (including histograms/ cumulative distributions of the 
data, KS Test Results, and a table of percent differences between the models for each 
ACAT category) are available in the Appendix. KS tests concluded that the two models 
were statistically different for each ACAT category.  
ERAM 3.0 Validation  
Hypothesis testing with the unequal variance student t-Test were utilized to 
calculate ERAM 3.0 validity with respect to the historical data. The student t-Test 
requires the assumption that sample data are assumed to be approximately normally 
distributed. The test calculates a t-statistic and compares it to a critical value obtained 
from a t-Test table which indicates if there is enough information to support rejection of 
the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis, Ho, is that the difference between the ERAM 3.0 
sample mean and the historical data sample mean is zero. The calculated t-statistic 
utilizes the means of each sample ( X ), an estimate of each sample’s standard deviation 
(S), and the number of observations for each data set (n). The t-Test equation is shown in 
(1). The subscripts delineate between the two sample sets and were assumed to have 
unequal variances. Equation (2) is calculates degrees of freedom (df).   
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(Banks, 2005: 438) 
If the calculated t-statistic is greater than the critical t-statistic (or p-value less 
than 0.05), there is strong evidence to support rejection of the null hypothesis.  Otherwise 
there is not enough information to support a statistical difference between the means of 
the two data sets. Wirthlin collected a limited data sample of historical program schedule 
from MS B-C (2009: 132-133) which were compared to the equivalent time frame in 
ERAM 3.0. A total of 10, 000 replications were utilized to construct the model data 
samples (Wirthlin, 2009: 137).  Histograms and t-Test results of the historical and ERAM 
3.0 data are presented in the following pages for each ACAT grouping. Figures 17-18 and 
Table 2 are the results for the All ACAT category.  
Under the null hypothesis, Ho, there was a significant difference between the 
ERAM 3.0 and the historical data for the All ACAT category based on the results in 
Table 2. The analysis was repeated for the individual ACAT categories. The ACAT I 
results are presented in Figures 19-20 and Table 3. 
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Figure 17: Histogram of ERAM 3.0 All ACAT MS B-C Schedule 
 
Figure 18: Historical Data All ACAT MS B-C Schedule (Wirthlin, 2009: 139) 
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Table 2: All ACAT MS B-C t-Test Results 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
Statistic Historical Data  Model Data 
Mean 1620 2334 
Variance 991072 601220 
Observations 20 2602 
df 19 
 T Critical 2.09 
 T Calculated 3.20 
 P -Value 0.00 
  
 
Figure 19: Histogram of ERAM 3.0 ACAT I MS B-C Schedule 
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Figure 20: Historical Data ACAT I MS B-C Schedule (Wirthlin, 2009: 141) 
Table 3: ACAT I MS B-C t-Test Results 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
Statistic  Historical Data Model Data 
Mean 1801 3297 
Variance 1435250 417191 
Observations 12 645 
df 11 
 T Critical 2.20 
 T Calculated 4.32 
 P -Value 0.00 
  
Results in Table 3 show a significant difference between the means of ERAM 3.0 
and historical data for the ACAT I category and the null hypothesis was rejected.  The 
ACAT II analysis is presented in Figures 21-22 and Table 4. 
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Figure 21: Histogram of ERAM 3.0 ACAT II MS B-C Schedule 
 
Figure 22: Historical Data ACAT II MS B-C Schedule (Wirthlin, 2009: 143) 
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Table 4: ACAT II MS B-C t-Test Results 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
 Statistic Historical Data Model Data 
Mean 1476 2363 
Variance 422276 217613 
Observations 4 340 
df 3 
 T Critical 3.18 
 T Calculated 2.72 
 P -Value 0.07 
  
A p-value of 0.07 dictated that the null hypothesis was not rejected for the ACAT 
II category. Figures 23-24 and Table 5 display the ACAT III results. 
 
Figure 23: Histogram of ERAM 3.0 ACAT III MS B-C Schedule 
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Figure 24: Historical Data ACAT III MS B-C Schedule (Wirthlin, 2009: 145) 
Table 5: ACAT III MS B-C t-Test Results 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
 Statistic Historical Data Model Data 
Mean 1224 1945 
Variance 224564 234093 
Observations 4 1617 
df 3 
 T Critical 3.18 
 T Calculated 3.04 
 P -Value 0.06 
  
The null hypothesis was not rejected for the ACAT III category. The analysis 
results for comparing the program schedule from MS B-C for ERAM 3.0 and the 
historical data is summarized in Table 6. 
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Table 6: Summary of Results 
t-Test Results 
ACAT Group  p-value Result 
ALL 0 Reject Ho 
I 0 Reject Ho 
II 0.07 Fail to reject Ho 
III 0.06 Fail to reject Ho 
 
A second iteration of model refinement and data collection would have been 
beneficial in addressing the ERAM 3.0 validity for ACAT I and All ACAT categories, 
but there was not adequate project schedule to accomplish this. However, based on the 
available sample data, ERAM 3.0 was valid for ACAT II and III programs. For academic 
purposes, this level of model validity was adequate to continue the research. Next, the 
author will demonstrate how acquisition reform policies may be simulated in ERAM 3.0 
to quantitatively support policy implementation in reality and further characterize 
DT&E’s role in acquisitions.  
ERAM 3.0 Interventions 
 This section demonstrates how potential acquisition reform policy may be 
executed in ERAM 3.0 and the resulting impacts analyzed to support reform 
implementation. Referred to as interventions, ERAM 3.0 was modified in an explicit 
method with results compared to the baseline ERAM 3.0 data through hypothesis testing. 
A one tailed, unequal variance t-test was utilized. The null hypothesis for all 
interventions was: “The difference between the intervention mean and baseline mean is 
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0.” The interventions were chosen based on discussions with SMEs and a select few 
identified by Wirthlin as having unexpected results in ERAM 1.0. The interventions are 
based on concepts of improved program quality, test item quality, test item quantity, and 
RTO resource availability. Table 7 provides a list of the different types of excursion that 
are investigated. The t-Test analysis was only conducted for the All ACAT category. The 
results are presented in tabular format with additional information regarding the 
differences between the model’s descriptive statistics available in the Appendix.  
Table 7: All ACAT Interventions Summary 
Intervention 
Program 
Quality 
Test Item 
Quality 
Test Item 
Quantity 
RTO Resource 
Availability 
TRR   X    
SVR X X   
RTO Test Resource Availability    X 
Test Item Quantity   X  
Additional Test Missions  X X   
Decrease Maximum Delay to First Test 
Mission  X  X 
Decrease Test Item Deficiencies  X   
Aggregate X X X X 
 
TRR Intervention 
 ERAM 1.0 concluded that the TRR activities did not significantly impact program 
schedule. This result was surprising because SMEs indicated scheduling of test ranges 
was a significant source of program delay (Wirthlin, 2009: 189).  For this intervention in 
ERAM 1.0, Wirthlin adjusted the probability of passing the TRR from 70% to 100% 
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which represented an increase in the quality of a program. The same intervention strategy 
was executed in ERAM 3.0 where the baseline value of 90% successes was adjusted to 
100%. The results of the t-test (p-value of 0.41), shown in Table 8, indicate that there is 
not enough evidence to support rejection of the null hypothesis at the 95% confidence 
level. This supports Wirthlin’s original conclusion that the TRR is not a critical activity 
for acquisition programs in regards to program schedule. The increase in the intervention 
mean in Table 8 is attributed to the insignificance of the activity combined with the 
stochastic nature of the model because the value remains within the standard error.  
Table 8: TRR Intervention Results 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
Statistic Baseline Intervention 
Mean 4237 4243 
Variance 2867719 2885263 
Observations 6582 6592 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 13172 
 t Stat -0.21 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.41 
 t Critical one-tail 1.64 
  
SVR Intervention 
The SVR ensures that programs have adequately conducted DT&E and addressed 
major test item deficiencies with a baseline probability of 85% passing the review. 
ERAM 1.0 implemented the intervention with the acquisition reform concept of programs 
adequately addressing all test item issues before the SVR resulting in a 100% probability 
of passing the review. The same intervention strategy was implemented in ERAM 3.0 
where the baseline value of 95% was increased to 100%. The results are in Table 9. 
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Table 9: SVR Intervention Results 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
Statistic Baseline Intervention 
Mean 4237 4233 
Variance 2867719 2874276 
Observations 6582 6594 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 13174 
 t Stat 0.12 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.45 
 t Critical one-tail 1.64 
  
The two tailed t-Test resulted in a p-value=0.45 meaning that there was not 
enough evidence to support rejection of the null hypothesis and the difference between 
the baseline and intervention data are insignificant. This result supports SMEs 
observations that indicated that by the time a program arrives to the SVR there is a very 
high probability that it will pass regardless of whether there are still deficiencies. The 
DAMS supports pushing a less capable product to the warfighter in less time than 
providing the 100% solution in a longer time frame.  This concept is sometimes referred 
to as the “%80 solution” in the acquisition community.   
RTO Test Resource Availability Intervention 
 SPO SMEs indicated that many programs experienced significant program 
schedule delays because of a lack of RTO test resources while executing tests. This delay 
factor included priority conflicts over test ranges (the factor most commonly mentioned), 
RTO test personnel, test range personnel, maintenance, test support aircraft, and other 
RTO test infrastructure. The acquisition reform this intervention represents in reality 
would be the procurement of more test ranges, test personnel, maintenance personnel, test 
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support aircraft, and other RTO test infrastructure to decrease the probability of delays 
due to this factor. For this intervention, the probability that a test mission cancelation or 
abort occurs is reduced from the baseline value (FOUO) to 0%. The results are 
summarized in Table 10. 
Table 10: RTO Test Resource Intervention Results 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
Statistic Baseline Intervention 
Mean 4237 4247 
Variance 2867719 2881313 
Observations 6582 6574 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 13154 
 t Stat -0.32 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.37 
 t Critical one-tail 1.64 
  
The p-value is 0.37 and the null hypothesis was not rejected. The availability of 
RTO test resources during test execution does not significantly impact program schedule 
to MS C. This result is surprising considering the number of SMEs who indicated that 
there was an availability issue with RTO test infrastructure resources significantly 
impacting programs. This result warrants further investigation and is discussed in Chapter 
V.  
Additional Test Missions Intervention 
 Several DT&E SMEs addressed how additional test schedule would be of value to 
address test item deficiencies. How much more time could be spent in DT&E without 
significantly impacting the programs schedule to MS C? This time could be utilized to 
execute additional test missions and potentially find more test item deficiencies resulting 
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in a higher quality weapon system delivered to the warfighter in statistically the same 
amount of time. This intervention was executed by increasing the initial required number 
of test missions required to progress through DT&E by 10%. The intervention results are 
in Table 11. 
Table 11: 110% Additional Test Missions Intervention Results 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
Statistic Baseline Intervention 
Mean 4237 4284 
Variance 2867719 2941144 
Observations 6582 6596 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 13175 
 t Stat -1.57 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.06 
 t Critical one-tail 1.64 
  
 This intervention did not have a statistically significant impact on the program 
schedule (p-value = 0.06) indicating that a program could execute 10% add test missions 
without significantly impacting schedule. The intervention was repeated at 115% (results 
in Table 12) which had a significant impact to on schedule and the null was rejected. This 
set of interventions indicated that a program could be required to execute between 10%-
15% addition test missions without significantly impacting schedule to MS C. 
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Table 12: 115% Test Missions Required Results 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
Statistic Baseline Intervention 
Mean 4237 4306 
Variance 2867719 2980340 
Observations 6582 6604 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 13181 
 t Stat -2.32 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.01 
 t Critical one-tail 1.64 
  
Decrease Maximum Delay to Execution of First Test Mission Intervention 
 After passing the TRR, SMEs identified a delay before test execution begins and 
was attributed to several factors including poor test item quality, delay due to test range 
availability, and the RTO technical reviews. These delays are represented by a single 
abstract process block, “Delay to First Test Mission,” with a triangular distribution of (1, 
30, 365). SMEs indicated that the maximum value in the distribution was representative 
of poor test item quality and RTO test range unavailability. If better quality test items 
were produced through use of technology with higher technology readiness levels, 
increased systems engineering efforts earlier in acquisitions, better-trained personnel, and 
other engineering practices then the maximum observed value in the triangular 
distribution could be decreased. In this intervention, the maximum delay is decreased to 
45 days. This value was suggested by SMEs as the maximum delay to complete the RTO 
technical reviews without any RTO test resource or test item issue delays. This decrease 
was acknowledged to be unrealistic but was a practical starting point because if this value 
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was found insignificant, then no values between 45 and 365 would be either. Intervention 
results are summarized in Table 13. 
Table 13: 45 Days Maximum Delay to Execution of First Test Mission Results 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
Statistic Baseline Intervention 
Mean 4237 4148 
Variance 2867719 2854192 
Observations 6582 6574 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
df 13154 
t Stat 3.01 
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.00 
t Critical one-tail 1.64 
 
 The intervention results reject the null hypothesis and the two models are 
statistically different. A program will save 2% of schedule time (see analysis results in 
Table 33 in the Appendix) to MS C if the program can decrease the maximum amount of 
time to the execution of the first test mission to 45 days. However, decreasing the 
maximum delay to 45 may be unrealistic. Another intervention was simulated with the 
max delay adjusted to 182.5 or 50% of the baseline. Table 14 contains the results. 
Table 14: 182.5 Days Maximum Delay to Execution of First Test Mission Results 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
 Statistic Baseline Intervention 
Mean 4237 4185 
Variance 2867719 2850115 
Observations 6582 6601 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
df 13181 
t Stat 1.77 
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.04 
t Critical one-tail 1.64 
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 This iteration had a significant impact on program schedule (p-value= 0.04) with 
a 1% decrease in the mean (see Table 34 in Appendix I).  The intervention was repeated 
at a maximum delay of 228.125 (or a 37.5% decrease in the baseline). The p-value was 
calculated at 0.08 and the t-Test failed to reject the null hypothesis (refer to Table 15).  
Table 15: 228.125 Days Maximum Delay to Execution of First Test Mission Results 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
Statistic Baseline Intervention 
Mean 4237 4196 
Variance 2867719 2857758 
Observations 6582 6570 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
df 13150 
t Stat 1.40 
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.08 
t Critical one-tail 1.64 
 
This set of interventions revealed that a decrease in the maximum delay of the 
execution of the first test mission to greater than approximately 200 days will result in a 
significant impact to program schedule to MS C. 
Test Item Deficiencies Intervention 
 The most commonly mentioned DT&E program delay factor was overly 
optimistic DT&E schedule based on optimal weapon system performance. The historical 
test mission data collected tracked test mission cancelation and aborts due to test item 
issues. Test deficiencies may also be discovered but not result in a test mission 
cancelation or abort. For this intervention, the probability of a cancelation, abort, or 
discovery of a test item deficiency was decreased from the baseline values (FOUO) to 
0%. Although this value may be unrealistic, it was an efficient analysis technique. 
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Decreasing test item deficiencies could be executed in reality through increasing the 
quality of test items through more emphasis on early systems engineering activities, 
utilization of more mature technologies, early prototyping, and other engineering efforts. 
Table 16 summarizes the intervention results.  
Table 16: 100% Decrease in Test Item Deficiencies Results 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
Statistic Baseline Intervention 
Mean 4237 4134 
Variance 2867719 2737611 
Observations 6582 6574 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
df 13148 
t Stat 3.54 
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.00 
t Critical one-tail 1.64 
 
 The null hypothesis was rejected at a p-value=0 with a mean decrease of 2% (see 
Table 35 in Appendix I). A second iteration was simulated with a value of 50% fewer test 
deficiencies.  
Table 17: 50% Decrease in Test Item Deficiencies Results 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
Statistic Baseline Intervention 
Mean 4237 4183 
Variance 2867719 2781795 
Observations 6582 6587 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
df 13164 
t Stat 1.85 
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.03 
t Critical one-tail 1.64 
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The models were significantly different (as indicated in Table 17) with a p-value 
of 0.03 and the null hypothesis was rejected. The intervention was repeated at a 37.5% 
reduction in test item deficiencies and the results are presented in Table 18. A calculated 
p-value of 0.08 resulted in failure to reject the null hypothesis. This set of interventions 
revealed that a decrease in test item deficiencies between 50%-37.5% would be required 
to have a significant impact on program schedule. 
Table 18: 37.5% Decrease in Test Item Deficiencies Results 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
Statistic Baseline Intervention 
Mean 4237 4195 
Variance 2867719 2800061 
Observations 6582 6608 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
df 13185 
t Stat 1.44 
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.08 
t Critical one-tail 1.64 
 
Test Item Quantity Intervention 
 For large programs, often there is only a single test article available for testing. 
How would having two test articles impact program schedule? This intervention 
investigated the idea that if the RTO had sufficient, qualified test personnel and test 
infrastructure to effectively execute test missions for two test articles, the number of 
potential test missions executed per day would increase by a factor of two. The 
intervention results are presented in Table 19. This intervention resulted in significant 
difference between models (p-value=0). The mean decreased by 14% (see Table 37 in 
Appendix I for analysis). 
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Table 19: Test Item Quantity Results 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
Statistic Baseline Intervention 
Mean 4237 3655 
Variance 2867719 2310744 
Observations 6582 6605 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 13024   
t Stat 20.77   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.00   
t Critical one-tail 1.64   
 
Aggregate Intervention 
This intervention investigated a system approach to acquisition reform. The 
following combination of factors was utilized to provide a realistic combination of 
reforms: Maximum Delay to First Test Mission (228.125), Maximum Delay to TRR 
(135), TRR (100%), SVR (100%), Test Item Quantity (2), and Test Item Deficiency (-
25%). The results are shown in Table 20. 
Table 20: Aggregate Intervention Results 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
Statistic Baseline Intervention 
Mean 4237 3613 
Variance 2867719 2300524 
Observations 6582 6603 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 13017   
t Stat 22.30   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.00   
t Critical one-tail 1.64   
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The null hypothesis was rejected at a p-value= 0. This intervention resulted in a mean 
schedule decrease of approximately 15% (see Table 38 for analysis). 
Intervention Analysis and Results Summary    
 DTEM increased the fidelity of the ERAM 1.0 DT&E activities further 
characterizing DT&E’s role in the DAMS. The higher fidelity DT&E activities enabled 
investigation of several interventions attainable by no other practical method. A summary 
of the intervention results is available in Table 21.  
Table 21: Intervention Results Summary 
Intervention Results 
TRR  Not significant 
SVR Not significant  
RTO Test Resource 
Availability  Not significant  
Test Item Quantity  Significant at 2 test items, 14% mean schedule decrease 
Additional Test Missions  Significant at greater than 10% additional test missions  
Maximum Delay to First 
Test Mission 
Significant at greater than 37.5% maximum delay decrease, 2% 
mean schedule decrease 
Test Item Deficiencies 
Significant at greater than 37.5% decrease in the number of 
deficiencies, 2% mean schedule decrease 
Aggregate  Significant, 15% mean schedule decrease 
The Null Program  
Previous research by Baldus and others (2013) presented the concept of executing 
a null program that “did nothing” which effectively investigated how much time a 
program spent in system was due to process. A similar methodology was utilized for this 
investigation. DTEM was adjusted to execute a single test mission in order to observe 
how much time a program would spend in DT&E executing the process. For this 
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intervention, the DT&E time was defined as the time from passing the TRR to passing 
the SVR. The results are displayed in Figure 25 and Table 22. 
 
Figure 25: Histogram of DT&E Time to Execute One Test Mission  
Table 22: DT&E Time to Execute One Test Mission 
Results 
Mean 225 
Standard Error 1 
Median 209 
Standard Deviation 100 
Sample Variance 10008 
Range 951 
Minimum 33 
Maximum 984 
Count 10000 
Confidence Level (95%) 2 
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The 95% confidence interval for executing a single test mission (with 10,000 
replications) was calculated to be 224 +/- 2 days. This was a surprisingly high value with 
two implications. First, if the results are valid representations of reality, they suggest that 
a large amount of program schedule delay is due to the process itself. The same 
conclusion was reached by Wirthlin (2008: 211). In addition, this could hint at a possible 
acquisition “bottleneck” located at DT&E where programs are waiting in the “DT&E 
queue” to conduct testing. However, if the results are not valid, then the large amount of 
time required to execute one test missions suggests DTEM requires additional validation 
efforts and refinement for executing small numbers of test missions. Future work is 
necessary to investigate the validity of this result and is discussed in Chapter V. 
Chapter Summary 
This research did not exhaust all means by which ERAM may prove beneficial to 
the acquisition community nor is it absolute in its results. As shown in this research, 
modeling and simulation is an iterative process building upon the foundation of previous 
research. Regardless of the initial answers, future work will build upon the previous 
expanding ERAM’s capabilities to further demonstrate the utility this tool. The final 
chapter will discuss significant findings uncovered during this research project and 
aspects of ERAM which warrant additional research. 
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V.  Conclusions 
Chapter Overview 
 The purpose of this research was to utilize computer modeling and simulation to 
increase the fidelity of the DT&E processes with the goal of gaining new insight into 
DT&E’s role in acquisition. Through increasing the fidelity of ERAM 1.0, the results of 
ERAM 3.0 supported two previous research conclusions and provided a different 
conclusion on a third. In addition, based on SME discussions and literature, several 
potential DT&E delay factors were identified, characterized in ERAM 3.0, and analyzed 
to analyze their significance with respect to program schedule. Chapter V provides 
conclusions based on the results and analysis of Chapter IV, areas for future work, and 
how this research could potentially impact acquisitions.  
ERAM Observations 
 Poor Test Item Quality 
 Discussion with SMEs identified two primary potential DT&E program schedule 
delay factors: poor test item quality and a lack of RTO test resources. Interestingly, 
relevant literature was available on all of the delay factors investigated in this research 
and senior leadership appears to be well aware of them. Yet, acquisition reform is not a 
new concept (see to Figures 2-3) and continues to take longer than expected. The 
apparent ineffectiveness of acquisition reforms may be, in part, due to the DAMS state of 
causal ambiguity and long program cycle times. These observations further support the 
underlying concept of this research (and Wirthlin’s) that the acquisition community could 
benefit from simulation model (similar to ERAM) with the capability of quantitatively 
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estimating the impact of acquisition reform initiatives to support senior leadership 
decision making.   
SPO and DT&E Relationship 
All of the individuals who participated in this research expressed a genuine desire 
to improve the DAMS. The fundamental objectives, priorities, and perspectives of the 
DT&E and SPO communities or organizations are not always the same and at times 
conflicting. Discussions with SMEs from both communities offered insights into what 
their respective collective believes are primary factors in program schedule delay. Both 
communities identified overly optimistic program schedule based on high quality test 
items as the most significant and common delay factor. The reality is that test 
deficiencies are always discovered and are generally corrected. However, not all 
deficiencies are adequately addressed. Pressure to push weapon systems through DAMS 
drives sub-optimal test program management and test practices. Interestingly, the SPO 
community also identified the DT&E sub-optimal test methodology as a source of delay. 
One key document discovered during the literature review investigated the hypothesis 
that the “Department’s developmental and operational test communities’ approach to 
testing drives undue requirements, excessive cost, and added schedule into programs and 
results in a state of tension between Program Offices and the Testing Community” 
(Gilmore, 2011). The results of the investigation “found no significant evidence that the 
testing community typically drives unplanned requirements, cost or schedule into 
programs” and that “programs are most often delayed because of the results of testing, 
not the testing itself” (Gilmore, 2011).  ERAM 3.0 results supported this conclusion in 
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that the results of testing, such as test item deficiencies due to poor test item quality, are a 
significant source of program delay and a prime area for future acquisition reform.  
RTO Resource Availability 
This research investigated two aspects of RTO test resource availability: pre-test 
execution and test execution RTO test resource availability. The pre-test execution 
availability of RTO test resources (refer to the Maximum Delay to First Test Mission 
Intervention) significantly impacted program schedule which, according to SMEs, was 
believed to be largely due to a lack of RTO test ranges. However, once the program 
entered the test execution phase of DT&E, the RTO test resources did not significantly 
impact program schedule (refer to the RTO Test Resource Availability Intervention). The 
results suggest that there is a program “bottle-neck” located at DT&E, possibly due to the 
large number of programs attempting to utilize a limited number of test ranges, and a 
program will experience significant schedule delays here. However, once the program 
enters test execution phase it will unlikely encounter significant schedule delays due to 
RTO test resource availability.  This was an interesting result because the model did not 
agree with SME opinion that test resource availability was a significant source of delay 
both prior to and during testing. This may be in part due to a skewed local perspective 
where RTO test resource availability does in fact significantly impact DT&E program 
schedule, but is not significant with respect to schedule to MS C. If the model results are 
valid, it further supports the basis for the need of a simulation model (like ERAM) to 
assist in educating the acquisition community on the complex relationships within DAMS 
and to assist in supporting acquisition reform. 
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DT&E Silver Bullet  
The most substantial improvement from a single intervention was a 14% decrease 
in the average program schedule (up to MS C) based on providing the RTO additional 
test items enabling execution of twice as many test missions per day. This intervention 
decreased the mean time to MS C by approximately 590 days or 1.6 years. Many other 
interventions were also significant, but were limited to less than 2% reduction in the 
schedule mean which may by statistically significant, but not practically significant. 
Because ERAM 3.0 does not take into account the cost of these interventions, it is 
difficult to conclude their financial feasibility. Future work should investigate integration 
of the financial domain into the ERAM legacy to broaden its capabilities. Regardless, the 
ERAM 3.0 demonstrated how modeling and simulation could be utilized to better 
understand system level impacts through implementing local policy reform.   
Program Schedule Confidence Intervals 
 One of the most interesting results of this research can be seen in Figure 25 which 
depicts the time required in DT&E to execute a single test mission. The idea that a 
program could spend over 200 days in DT&E to execute a single test mission is 
staggering. It would be interesting to observe the differences between the execution of 
one test mission, progressively increasing the value, and quantifying the point at which 
the time required to test additional test missions becomes significantly different. The 
results could indicate that the confidence intervals for executing one, five, ten, or more 
test missions are statistically the same meaning that on average a small program could 
plan to execute more test missions and on average incur a statistically insignificant delay.  
In addition, during the literature review two ERAM research vectors were identified 
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highlighting how the recent research modified ERAM to focus on single program 
prediction estimates rather than system level performance. As was demonstrated with the 
execution of a single test mission, DTEM could easily be modified to the single program 
prediction research vector. By setting the required number of test missions to a programs 
estimate, the stochastic nature of DTEM combined with Monte Carlo analysis will 
produce a confidence interval for the a program’s DT&E schedule. This could potentially 
be a valuable tool for both the SPO and RTO communities for estimating DT&E schedule 
and warrants future research.  
Future Research 
Model Validation 
Modeling and simulation projects are iterative endeavors (Law, 2007: 67) and the 
several areas of improvement for this research are discussed below which were selected 
by the author as critical deficiencies in the 3.0 research. ERAM briefings were presented 
to SAF/AQXC, OUSD (AT&L)/ ARA/OS & FM, DAU, and AFLCMC/AQT who 
provided input regarding the research methodology, assumptions, and areas of concern. 
ERAM’s validity was the primary concern from these organizations and emanated from 
the utilization of SME inputs for a majority of the model input parameters. Combined 
with the small historical MS B-C program schedule sample sizes, these organizations 
were concerned with ERAMs validity. ERAM was never intended to be utilized in its 
current configuration as the tool for senior leaders. Its goal was to demonstrate how 
computer modeling and simulation could be utilized in addressing acquisition reform. If 
senior DoD leadership desired a tool with the capabilities ERAM demonstrated, then 
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another iteration of ERAM could be executed by a team of acquisition experts who could 
create a more valid model than a single doctoral candidate and several masters students 
could. However, if ERAM were to be utilized in its current configuration, efforts should 
focus on acquiring historical data to replace the SME inputs and collect a larger sample 
size to improve ERAM’s validity.  
New DoDI 5000.02  
An updated version of the DoDI 5000.02 series was released during the writing of 
this thesis (USD, 2013). ERAM should be updated to reflect changes in the new DoDI 
5000.02 instruction. One of the major changes discussed with SMEs was the ability to 
tailor the program’s acquisition plan. This will result in numerous new possible pathways 
in ERAM and will undoubtedly impact program schedule. Interestingly, when asked how 
DT&E would be impacted by the new instruction, many SMEs indicated that at the test 
execution level there will be no change hinting that as much as DTEM is a valid 
representation of the current 5000.02 series, it will potentially have the same level of 
validity in the updated series. However, any actual impacts the new instruction may have 
on DT&E and acquisitions will take several years for programs to cycle through the 
DAMS and observe any process changes in reality.  
Delay To First Test Mission  
 The DTEM block “Delay To First Test Mission” was purposefully made, early in 
the model building phase, as an abstract representation of several delay concepts in order 
to simplify modeling efforts. This resulted in the confounding of several critical delay 
factors which were later viewed to have potentially substantial impacts on DT&E 
program schedules. If another iteration of model building and calibration was possible, 
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the “Delay To First Test Mission” block should be separated into three parallel processes 
representing delays due to RTO technical reviews, initial test item problems, and RTO 
test range scheduling conflicts. As was displayed in Chapter IV’s test problem 
interventions, several areas of the DTEM model were tested separately when in reality 
there would be some interdependency between the processes. Quantifying the 
interdependencies between the initial delay due to test item problems and the probability 
of finding test problems during test execution could result in even improved program 
schedule performance results and reinforce the idea that test item quality is a significant 
factor in program schedule delays.   
 Other MRTFBs  
The historical test mission data utilized in this research project was only one of 
many MRTFB across the country as shown in Figure 26. It would be interesting to 
analyze test mission data from several MRTFBs and compare how test execution delay 
factors compared between the MRTFBs. If significant differences were present, it may 
suggest that program schedule performance could be MRTFB dependent.  
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Figure 26: Map of DoD MRTFBs (DAG, 2012: 150) 
Final Thoughts 
 The ERAM research has demonstrated how modeling and simulation can provide 
a powerful analytical capability for supporting acquisition reform. This research 
improved the fidelity of the ERAM DT&E activities providing additional quantitative 
evidence supporting new insights into how DT&E impacts major defense acquisition 
programs. The DAMs is composed of people, process, organizations, cultural, money, 
politics, technology, and other risks. These aspects and their complex interactions are 
difficult to completely capture in a simulation model.  In an academic setting with 
restrained resources, a higher fidelity DT&E model (DTEM) was created, increasing the 
ERAM DT&E construct from 17 to over 80 blocks.  No amount of effort will ever 
produce a 100% exact representation of the DAMS, but this is a known limitation of all 
simulation. However, the methodology utilized in this research is based on an iterative 
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process where future efforts will identify and correct deficiencies converging to a product 
capable of supporting acquisition reform. DTEM captured the “essence of the system” 
(Banks, 2005: 14), supported previous conclusions by Wirthlin, demonstrated a new 
capability for estimating program DT&E schedules, and further refined acquisition 
reform analytics. “All models are wrong, but some are useful” (Box, 1987: 424) and this 
research is a prime example of how abstracted models can clarify complex processes.  
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Appendix A: Example Discussion Topics 
T&E Research Discussion Topics 
The focus of this research is the “as is” Air Force T&E processes from Pre-
Milestone A to Milestone C. Discussion information will be compiled into an AFIT 
Master’s thesis. Your name, official title, or any identification information will not be 
used in order to encourage honest responses to the questions and promote discussion. If 
you would like to have your name included in this research effort, please let me know. 
 Background Questions 
1. What acquisition jobs have you held? 
2. What were the ACAT levels of the programs you were involved with? 
3. What T&E activities or reviews have you been involved with?  
General T&E Questions  
4. What are the major T&E activities in acquisitions?  
5. What are the major T&E decisions/reviews?   
6. What are the critical T&E documents? 
7. What non T&E activities or decisions have large impacts on T&E activities or 
decisions?  
8. Are there T&E activities where schedule delays are expected to occur? 
a. If so, why are schedule delays expected to occur here? 
T&E Model Specific Questions 
Instructions: Accompanying this document is a Visio file containing the current T&E 
process model. The model is constructed of two types of modeling concepts: activities 
and decisions. Activities are displayed as rectangles in the flowchart and decisions as 
diamonds. As you review the model, please consider the following questions: 
9. Are the processes in the correct order? Take into account whether the sequence is 
correct as well as whether the process can occur in parallel or series with respect 
to other processes.  
a. If not, describe the correct order?  
10. Are there any T&E decisions/ activities which may have large impacts on a 
program’s schedule not represented in the model? 
a. If so, describe the activity/ decision and its placement in the model.  
11. Are there any areas of the model that can be simplified because they do not 
significantly impact a  
12. Are there any processes in the model that need to be modeled at a lower level 
fidelity because the lower level activity may have a large impact on a program’s 
schedule? 
a. If so, identify the lower level process and why it can have such a large 
impact on schedule.  
13. Look at each activity. Does the time required to complete the activity or decision 
probability change depending on the program’s ACAT level? 
a. If so, acknowledge this by inputting three triangular distributions next to 
the appropriate ACAT level in the SME Data Input Excel Sheet. 
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b. If the process time is the same regardless of ACAT level, input only one 
distribution and put an “X” in the other two ACAT boxes in the SME Data 
Input Excel Sheet.  
Additional Questions  
14. What T&E activities or decisions could you strongly influence? 
15. What T&E activities or decisions did you have little influence over? 
16. What T&E Phase processes would you concentrate acquisition reform efforts with 
the goal of addressing schedule/delay challenges?   
17. Are there any questions I have not asked that you think I should? 
18. Is there anyone specific that you recommend I interview? 
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Appendix B: Final Conceptual Model 
 
Figure 27: DTEM Conceptual Model 
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Appendix C: Configuration Control Document 
Enterprise Requirements Acquisition Model 
Configuration Management Worksheet 
        This form provides a listing of the development and the changes done on the ERAM Simulation Model. Use the table below to 
provide the simulation software used (Arena or ExtendSim), the new version number, the name of the author and 
corresponding organization, the date of revision and the description and purpose of changes.  
        
Simulation           
Software 
Source 
Version 
Number 
New Version 
Number 
Implemented 
By Org Date Description of Change 
Purpose of 
Change 
Arena 1.0 3.0 Sutherlin 
United States 
Air Force 
Institute of 
Technology 
03/27/14 
- Integrated DTEM model 
into ERAM 1.0 replacing the 
following blocks: 
- Test Readiness Review 
- Check TRR looping 
condition 
-Determine TRR delay 
-TRR Delay PreC 
-Determine Cost and 
schedule penalties for TRR 
Delays 
-Developmental system 
testing and Live Fire test and 
Operational Assessment 
testing 
-Make Trades? 
Check looping condition 
-Determine trades delay 
-Trades Delay PreC 
Determine cost and schedule 
penalties for trades delays 
-Combined Testing 
-Assign Set close to end 
SDD contract condition 
-System Verification Review 
Set SVR rework 
-SVR rework and delay 
-Set SVR delay cost and 
schedule penalties 
 
 
 
Improved 
fidelity of 
ERAM 1.0 
DT&E activities 
to enable 
investigation of 
DT&E delay 
factors  
-  
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Appendix D: Acronym List 
ACAT  Acquisition Category 
ADDM Acquisition Document Development Model 
AF Air Force 
AFSPC/A5 Air Force Space Command's Directorate of Requirements 
APM Acquisition Process Model 
DAE Defense Acquisition Executive 
DAMS Defense Acquisition Management System 
df degrees of freedom 
DoD Department of Defense 
DT&E Developmental Test and Evaluation 
DTEM  Developmental Test and Evaluation Model 
ERAM Enterprise Requirements and Acquisitions Model 
FOUO For Official Use Only 
GAO Government Accountability Office 
JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integrations and Development System 
MRTFB  Major Range and Test Facility Base 
MS  Milestone 
PEO Program Executive Officer 
PM Program Manager 
PPBE Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution 
RAMP Requirements and Acquisitions Management Plan 
RTO Responsible Test Organization 
SAE Service Acquisition Executive 
SMART Systems Metric and Reporting Tool 
SME Subject Matter Expert 
SVR Systems Verification Review 
TRR Test Readiness Review 
US United States 
 
 
 
 
 
77 
Appendix E: DTEM Construct and Input Parameters 
The following pages will step through the DTEM and explain in detail the various 
blocks, distributions, and model logic. DTEM was created as a separate model with the 
intent to integrate it into the ERAM 1.0. In order to accomplish this, key interface blocks 
and variables in ERAM 1.0 are present in DTEM which have no impact on the model if 
run separately from ERAM but were purposefully retained to support integration efforts. 
DTEM may be simulated as a stand-alone model or it may be incorporated into ERAM 
1.0 with an adjustment to the “Assign ACAT Level and Number of Required Test 
Missions” block which will be discussed later. Unless stated otherwise, the inputs for the 
decision blocks will be presented as the percent true. The process time triangular 
distributions will be expressed in the order of minimum, mean, and maximum value. The 
model is divided into zones in order to provide a readable figure of the model.  
Zone 1 (in Figure 28) displays the initial phase of the DTEM. The first activity 
block is the “Delay to TRR” block which has a time distribution of 0, 14, and 180. This 
block represents the delay period before a program meets the TRR. The block inputs 
were provided by SMEs.  
78 
 
Figure 28: Zone 1 
The next activity is the “Pass Program Office TRR” (Figure 28) which has a 
probability of %90. The system level TRR evaluates a program’s preparedness for 
testing. If the program fails the review, it will proceed to the “TRR Rework Delay” block 
which has a triangular distribution of 17.5, 42.5, 70. This block represents the amount of 
time required for the program office to address issues identified during the TRR that 
caused the review failure. The input parameters were provided by SMEs.  
The “Assign ACAT Level and Number of Required Test Missions” block (Figure 
28) randomly selects the program ACAT level. The probability of ACAT selection is 24 
% for ACAT I, 14% ACAT II, and 62% ACAT III. These probabilities are historical data 
collected by Wirthlin (2009; 127).  
The “Assign ACAT Level and Number of Required Test Missions” decision 
block will direct the program to one of the three assignment blocks: “ACAT Level 1”, 
“ACAT Level 2”, or “ACAT Level 3” (refer to Figure 28). Each block contains an 
ACAT specific distribution which randomly assigns the baseline number of required test 
missions needed to accomplish DT&E. The variable “Total Number of Missions 
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Required” is utilized to hold the program in DT&E until the total number of test missions 
required is achieved. The distribution were constructed by SMEs and are 88, 175, 385 for 
ACAT I, 36, 58, 117 for ACAT II, and 25, 41, 93 for ACAT III. It is important to note 
interesting phenomena occurred when asking SMEs to estimate these distributions. The 
question asked was, “For an ACAT III program, what is the min, average, and maximum 
number of test missions required to successfully complete DT&E?” Anticipating that the 
answers would vary, this same question was asked to the same SME on different 
occasions. Different answers were received. For example, the same SME provided three 
estimates during three different discussions (approximately one week apart) for the 
minimum required test missions for an ACAT III program as 1, 30, and 75. In addition, 
because this question was referring to the number of test missions completed at the end of 
a program, the SMEs were taking into account the test mission growth due to 
cancellations, aborts, test mission effectiveness, and other factors which impacted the 
number of test missions required. It was necessary to reduce the distribution inputs by the 
test mission growth factor the SME was taking into account. SMEs identified that on 
average, a program would experience a 30% growth based on the original estimate. The 
final values populating the “Total Number of Test Missions Required” are an average of 
SME inputs after subtracting 30% for test mission growth.  
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Figure 29: Zone 2 
The “Delay to First Test Mission” (refer to Figure 29) is the delay a program 
experiences after passing the TRR to execution of the first test mission. The block has a 
distribution of 1, 30, 365 and was provided by SMEs. This abstract block represents 
several potential activities and delays for a program. SMEs discussed that for large 
programs, once the test item is delivered to the RTO there may be test item issues 
prohibiting test mission execution. These issues must be addressed before the test item 
may be operated. Other delays captured by this block are the RTO technical and safety 
reviews. The reviews last for several hours and occur at weekly intervals. Exceptions are 
made for higher priority programs or special circumstances. A program with a high 
quality test item which accomplished the RTO technical reviews in parallel with the TRR 
could potentially execute the first test mission one day after a successful TRR. On the 
opposite spectrum, a poor quality test item may take up to a year to correct test item 
deficiencies before the item is capable of test mission execution.  
For large programs, the RTO technical and safety reviews occur regularly for 
each stage of testing. These phases of testing occur simultaneously depending upon 
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priority, technical risk, safety, and other criteria. This method of test execution allows for 
improved control of program schedule when test deficiencies are discovered. Each stage 
of testing will be divided into focus areas containing similar testing requirements able to 
be executed during a single mission. For example, an aircraft weapon system’s test plan 
may include several stages of high and low speed flight test. After completion of several 
high speed flight test stages and a test item issue is discovered, it may be reasonable to 
execute other low speed or ground test missions in order to minimize schedule delay 
while a fix is implemented for the high speed issue. The RTO will attempt to execute 
these reviews in parallel with testing of other phases in order to minimize program 
schedule delay. Thus, only the first RTO review is accounted for in the model because 
the following reviews occur in parallel with testing and are already accounted for. This 
model logic was supported by SMEs.   
The “DTE Execution Start Time Logic” (refer to Figure 29) routes programs 
which fail the “Pass System Verification Review” block (discussed later) around the 
“DTE Start Time” block. This keeps the model entity from resetting the “DTE Start 
Time” variable set in the proceeding “Start Time” assign block. 
The model executes DT&E test missions based on a projected number of test days 
executed in a single week (refer to Figure 30). The block “Start Week and Assign 
Number of Days Attempt to Execute Test Missions for 1 Week” randomly selects the 
number of test missions the RTO will attempt to execute in a single week. This decision 
directs the entity towards one of the next five assign blocks based on the probability that 
one (1%), two (90%), three (8%), four (0.5%), or five (0.5%) days of testing will be 
executed in one week. SMEs provided the probabilities and indicated that programs will 
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plan to execute at least one test missions every week eliminating the possibility of 
attempting zero. In addition, the probability of executing six or more times a week is not 
practical due to manning requirements, work load, data analysis time, and other factors 
for that RTO and not included in the model. This aspect of the model is dependent upon 
the RTO resources available and could be tailored to a specific organization.  
 
Figure 30: Zone 3 
After assigning the number of test days executed in a week, the delay due to non 
test days for that week is calculated by the “Days Not Testing Delay” shown in Figure 
30. For example, if a program executed two days of testing in one week, five days of non-
test days occurred, and the program experienced seven days of total delay.  
 The “Assign Number Test Missions Conducted For 1 Test Day” (refer to Figure 
30) randomly selects the number of test missions the RTO will attempt to execute on a 
single day. The probability of executing one test mission is 90%, two is 8%, and three is 
2%. These values were constructed from SME input. These probabilities are program/ 
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RTO resource dependent and representative of aircraft ground/ flight test missions where 
there is only one test aircraft.  
 Once the number of test missions for a single day of test is randomly selected, the 
entity will pass through one of the three assign blocks labeled “3 Missions” or “2 
Missions” or “1 Mission” as shown in Figure 30. In this block the variable “Missions Per 
Day” will track how many test missions are executed in one day. If three test missions 
per day is selected, the entity will progress to the “Create 3 Missions” block and three 
entities are created representing three test missions. From this point, the model logic is 
easier to understand if the program flowing through the model is viewed as a test mission 
entity. Each test mission entity will pass independently through DTEM until the 
“Combine 1 Days Worth of Testing” block discussed later.  
 The test mission entity will then progress through test mission cancel blocks as 
shown in Figure 31. Each block represents the probability that a test mission is canceled 
the day of test mission execution but before test mission execution begins. If a test 
mission cancelation occurs, the mission will not contribute towards the total number of 
test missions required to complete DT&E. The penalty for a cancelation depends on the 
cancel factor which his discussed in the next paragraph. The test mission cancelation data 
are based on FOUO historical data and not presented in the research paper. 
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Figure 31: Zone 4 
 The “Test Item Cancel” factor represents problems due to poor quality test 
articles. If this block is true, the program will incur a penalty to the total number of test 
missions required. The penalty is based on a distribution of 0, 1, 3 test missions which 
will be added to the original baseline total number of test missions required variable. 
SMEs indicated that test item issues can generally be addressed in parallel with other 
testing resulting in no schedule delay. This is the reasoning for a test mission cancelation 
85 
occurring but no program delay is experienced (represented by the minimum value of 
zero in the triangular distribution).  
  The “Weather Cancel” block represents the probability of a test mission 
cancellation due to weather. This delay factor does not result in a penalty.  
 The “Resource Cancel” refers to the cancelation of a test mission attributed to 
non-availability of RTO test resources. These resources may include test aircraft, test 
personnel, test ranges, ground instrumentation, and other test infrastructure. Programs are 
assigned a priority number which is one method utilized to decide which programs 
receive resource support. In DTEM, there is no penalty associated with a successful result 
in this block.  
 The “Administrative Cancel” largely represents the concept of scheduling primary 
and secondary test missions. For every test mission an RTO plans to execute, a backup 
mission is also scheduled as a risk mitigation technique in case the primary mission is 
canceled or less effective than required. If the primary mission is a success, the secondary 
mission is purposefully canceled by the RTO. The historical data indicated that the 
purposeful cancelation of backup test missions by the RTO represents an overwhelming 
majority of this block. However, other minor aspects accounted for include: the 
possibility of cancelation by senior RTO leadership due to observed safety issues, 
unanticipated support of civilian or military events, or other instances where RTO 
leadership cancels a test mission. There is no penalty associated with a successful result 
of this block.   
 If a mission is canceled, the entity will progress through one of the respective four 
cancel assign blocks in Figure 31. These blocks are used to assign delays and for 
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statistical analysis. After the assign block, the entity will attempt to execute a backup test 
mission. For each canceled test mission, a single backup test mission is attempted. The 
entity will pass through the “Set Cancel Flag” block (utilized for model analysis) and 
continue to the “Cancel Backup Test Mission Loop Check” which will direct the entity 
based on whether the test mission has already attempted a backup test mission.  The 
“Backup Mission Flag” block sets the “Backup Test Mission” variable which tracks if a 
backup mission has previously been attempted for this particular entity. There is no 
schedule penalty associated with executing a backup mission due to the assumption that 
the backup test mission is executed the same day as the primary mission.  
 If a test mission is not canceled, it will proceed to the test mission abort 
area of the model, shown in Figure 31, which operates according to similar logic as the 
test mission cancelation area. A test mission abort is defined as a test mission that started 
test execution but did not finish the mission due to one of four abort factors. The abort 
factor decision blocks are populated with FOUO historical data and not presented in this 
report.  If a mission is aborted, it will proceed to one of the “Test Item Abort,” “Weather 
Abort,” “Resource Abort,” or “Administrative Abort” assign blocks which are utilized for 
statistical analysis and delay calculation. The “Test Item Abort” block results in a delay 
of 0, 1, 3 test missions if true. The other abort assign blocks do not result in a penalty. 
The “Set Abort Flag” assign block is utilized for model analysis. 
  The “Test Item Deficiency Discovered #1” block (refer to Figure 32) represents 
the probability a test item deficiency is discovered during a test mission. This probability 
was provided by SMEs and has a value of 90%. If a deficiency is discovered, the 
probability it results in a delay is calculated by the “Additional Test Missions Required 
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#1” block and has a probability of 15%. SMEs indicated that a majority of test 
deficiencies are addressed in parallel to other testing efforts to minimize schedule impact. 
If a test item deficiency is selected to cause a delay, the “Assign Test Item Issues 
Missions Delay #1” block will calculate the additional test missions required based on a 
triangular distribution of 0.25, 1, 3. These inputs are SME estimates. The logic and block 
values are the same for test missions that do not abort progressing through the “Test Item 
Deficiency Discovered #2,” “Additional Test Missions Required #2,” and “Assign Test 
Item Issues Missions Delay #2” blocks.  
The “Abort Mission Effective?” block (refer to Figure 32) represents the 
probability that an aborted mission accomplished any test requirements before the 
mission abort occurred. This probability is based on FOUO historical data and not 
presented in the report. If the aborted test mission was effective, it will pass through the 
“Abort Mission Effectiveness Level” which will randomly select one of five assign 
blocks based on its probability of occurrence:  “75% Effective” (10%), “50% Effective” 
(75%), and “25% Effective” (15%). This model construct was supported and estimated 
by SMEs. These blocks represent the reality that a test mission may be executed and test 
requirements accomplished before the mission aborted. Test mission effectiveness may 
be measured in the number of test points completed compared to the original number of 
points planned. For example, if a test mission was executed that planned on executing ten 
test points, but only five were executed, the test mission was 50% effective. Thus 0.5 
effective test missions were completed and contributed towards the total number of test 
missions required to pass DT&E. Each test mission initially has the potential to 
contribute one effective test mission to the total number of test missions required to pass 
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DT&E. By definition, an aborted test mission did not complete all the test requirements 
and cannot be 100% effective. 
A test mission that does not cancel or abort will also progress through model logic 
to calculate test mission effectiveness. In Figure 32, test mission that are not canceled or 
aborted will proceed through the “Mission Effectiveness Level?” block. This block 
operates the same as the “Abort Mission Effectiveness Level?” block but with adjusted 
effectiveness levels and probabilities: “100% Effective” (10%), “75% Effective” (75%), 
and “25% Effective” (10%). Test missions that do not cancel or abort are assumed to be 
greater than 0% effective. 
 
Figure 32: Zone 5 
If a test mission was 75% effective, it will progress to the “75% Effective Make 
Trades?” block (refer to Figure 33). SMEs indicated that for test missions which were not 
100% effective, the SPO may decide that the data acquired are suitable for their analysis 
and not execute additional test missions to collect the rest of the data. This concept was 
referred to as making trades. SMEs provided estimates for these blocks: “75% Effective 
Make Trades?” (75%), “50% Effective Make Trades?” (50%), and “25% Effective Make 
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Trades?” (25%). If a program is 0%effective, a make trade situation is not possible. If a 
trade is able to be made, the “Update Mission Effectiveness Variable” block will assigned 
a value of one to the test mission effectiveness variable which will contribute one count 
towards the total number of test missions completed. If a make trade situation is not 
possible, the test mission entity retains the test mission effectiveness value. The “Update 
Total Missions Completed Variable” block updates the total number of effective test 
missions completed through the “Total Number of Test Missions Completed” variable.   
 
Figure 33: Zone 6   
 The “Was Mission Aborted” and “Backup Mission Available?” and “Backup Test 
Mission Effectiveness Check” (refer to Figure 34) direct the entity based on whether a 
test mission was aborted, less than 60% effective, and has not previously executed a 
backup mission. If these criteria are met, a single backup mission is attempted by looping 
90 
through the model. The requirement of a test mission effectiveness level greater than 60% 
was provided by SMEs.  
 The “Reset Flags” (refer to Figure 34) assign block resets the backup test mission, 
cancel, and abort flags. These flags control possible entity pathways based on what 
events have occurred for that test mission.  
If two test missions for a single day was selected in the “Assign Number Test 
Missions Conducted For 1 Test Day” (refer to Figure 30), each test mission will progress 
independently through the model (starting at the “Create 2 Test Mission” block) until the 
“Combine 1 Days Worth of Testing” block (refer to Figure 34). After each test mission 
has been canceled, aborted, or successfully completed, it will remain at this location until 
all test missions for that day also arrive. 
 
Figure 34: Zone 7 
After all test missions are executed for a single day of testing, one day of program 
schedule delay occurs in the “Delay for 1 Day of Testing Completed” block. The block 
“Update test Days Completed This Week” tracks how many days of testing are 
completed each week and will route the entity through the model until all test missions 
for a week are completed.  
When the total number of test missions completed equals the total number of test 
missions required, the block “Test missions Completed vs Required” (refer to Figure 35) 
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will direct the program out of test execution and into the final activities in DTEM. If the 
total number of completed test missions is less than the total number of required test 
missions, the entity will proceed to the “End of 1 Week” decision block. This block 
compares the number of completed test days with the number of test days assigned for 
one week. If the number of test days for one week of testing is less than the number 
assigned, the entity will loop through the model passing through the “Update Variables” 
block (which updates the number of test days completed) and the “Missions Left Logic 
Check” block. Once less than one test missions is required to complete the test execution 
phase of DTEM (difference between the number of test missions completed and number 
of test missions required), the “Missions Left Logic Check” block will assign one test 
mission for a single day of test. For example, if 300 test missions are required and 299.5 
test missions have been completed, DTEM will assign a maximum of one test missions to 
a single day of test. This logic prohibits executing two or three test missions to 
accomplish 0.5 test missions and potentially skewing the number of test missions 
completed. It is possible to complete more test missions than are required due to the 
model logic, but by a value less than one. Once the number of test days completed in a 
week equals the number of test days assigned for a single week, the block “End of 1 
Week” will direct the entity through the “Days Not Testing Delay” and “Update test days 
Completed and Assigned This Week” to the “Start Week and Assign Number of Days 
Attempt to Execute Test Missions For 1 Week” block. The entity will loop through the 
model as previously discussed until the number of test missions completed is equal to the 
number of test missions required.  
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Figure 35: Zone 8 
Once the total number of test missions completed equals the total number of test 
missions required, the “Test Missions Completed vs Required” block will direct the 
entity to the “Calculate Variables” block which identifies the finish time for test 
execution and updates other model variables. 
The “Analysis Delay” represents the final stages of test mission data analysis 
which will occur at the end of test execution. After a test mission, collected data require 
analysis. SMEs indicated that data analysis will occur in parallel with other test efforts 
and between test missions. If a specific test mission data require analysis before 
execution of the next test mission for that phase of testing, the RTO will attempt analyze 
the data between test missions or execute other phases of testing as allowed by priority, 
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technical risk, and safety risk in order to minimize schedule delay. Because the data 
analysis occurs in parallel with testing, it is included through representation in the test 
mission execution time. However, once the last test mission is executed, the time required 
to analyze the data must be accounted for which is done in the “Analysis Delay” block. 
This block has inputs of 1, 10.5, 90, and was provided by SMEs.  
The RTO will create DT&E program reports at regular intervals which provide 
the SPO with program performance. These reports incorporate data analysis results. RTO 
SMEs indicated that it is standard policy to be allowed up to three months to compile and 
finish the final program report after completion of data analysis of the last test mission. 
This finalization of the program DT&E report is represented by the “Finish DT Reports” 
and has SME inputs of 14, 30, 90.  
Next the entity will progress to the “Assign Set Close to end SDD contract 
Condition.” This block is from ERAM 1.0 and included in DTEM for integration 
purposes. The entity then enters the “Pass System Verification Review” block and has a 
probability of 95% of passing the review (based on SME input). SME consensus was that 
the likelihood of not passing a SVR is very small because any deficiencies found in 
DT&E should have been fixed by this point. It not, the deficiency is usually passed to 
next phase of DT&E. 
If a program does not pass SVR, it will progress to the “Check SVR Loop” 
decision block which observes the number of times a program has failed SVR. SMEs 
suggested the probability of failing two SVRs is highly unlikely and excluded from the 
model. The “Check SVR Loop” prevents programs from failing the SVR a second time. 
If a program has not previously failed the SVR, the entity will progress to the “Update 
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Total Number of Missions Required” block. This block calculates a penalty due to 
executing additional test missions in order to address the issues which caused the 
program to fail SVR. This penalty is determined by a percent of the original total number 
of required test missions and is added to the “Total Number of Test Missions Required” 
variable.  The distribution is 10%, 25%, 50% of the “Initial Total Number of Test 
Missions Required.” None of the SMEs were able to provide estimates for this 
distribution and the values are author estimates. After a test mission penalty is assigned, 
the entity will then proceed to the “Delay to First Test Mission” block previously 
discussed where the entity will loop through the model until completing all the required 
number of test missions.  
If a program does not fail the SVR, the entity will proceed to the “Set DTE Finish 
Flag” which is used for statistics collection. The entity will then exit the model and one 
DTEM simulation replication is complete. DTEM records a single observation of the user 
requested statistics to data files which are utilized for data analysis.  Because of the 
stochastic nature of DTEM, each replication will result in a different schedule time. 
Utilizing Monte Carlo techniques, thousands of programs are executed in DTEM. The 
ability to conduct analysis of the compilation of these data is discussed in Chapter IV. 
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Appendix G: Statistical Analysis of ERAM 1.0 and 3.0 DT&E Schedule 
For the purpose of this analysis section, DT&E time is defined as the time from 
entering the “Test Readiness Review” to passing the “System Verification Review” block 
in ERAM 1.0 which was instrumented with additional assign blocks and variables in 
order to gather the required data. ERAM 1.0 was executed and the respective number of 
ACAT programs which progressed though DT&E activities was utilized as the number of 
replications for DTEM to ensure an accurate comparison between the two models. It is 
important to note that DTEM represents the time programs in ERAM 3.0 will spend in 
DT&E. Regardless of whether the data was collected from ERAM 3.0 or DTEM, the 
results would be the same. However, due to the research timeline, DTEM was chosen to 
be run due to a drastically reduced simulation run time. In addition, a two-sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) Test was utilized for this analysis because it is sensitive to 
differences in sample distribution characteristics including mean, dispersion, and 
skewness (Siegel, 1988: 144).  The two-sample KS test compares the maximum absolute 
difference between the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) for each sample. If the 
maximum deviation is greater than the KS critical value, the null hypothesis that the two 
samples come from the same population is rejected. For large sample sizes (greater than 
25), the critical test statistic is calculated from equation (3) where m and n are the 
respective sample sizes.  
KS 1.36 m nstatistic
mn
+
=                                       (3) 
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For each ACAT grouping, a histogram and CDF of the time spent in DT&E for each 
model is presented followed by a data table with the differences between the descriptive 
statistics of the models. Lastly, the results of the KS test and differences between model 
descriptive statistics are discussed. The All ACAT grouping data is analyzed first in 
Figures 36-37 and Table 23 
 
Figure 36: Histogram ERAM 1.0 and 3.0 All ACATs DT&E Time 
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Figure 37: CDFs of ERAM 1.0 and ERAM 3.0 All ACATs DT&E Time 
Table 23: ERAM 1.0 and 3.0 All ACATs DT&E Normalized Statistics 
Exit at MS C ERAM 1.0 ERAM 3.0 % Difference 
Mean (days) 222.21 725.92 226.68 
Standard Error 1.73 4.54 161.95 
Median (days) 189.66 593.93 213.15 
Standard Deviation (days) 144.59 378.74 161.95 
Sample Variance 20905.12 143443.88 586.17 
Kurtosis 5.93 2.38 -59.81 
Skewness 1.93 1.60 -16.83 
Range (days) 1403.63 2845.11 102.70 
Minimum (days) 32.34 212.87 558.34 
Maximum (days) 1435.97 3057.98 112.96 
Program Count  6967.00 6967.00 0.00 
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The KS Test calculated an absolute maximum deviation b 0.048 with a critical 
statistic of 0.023 resulting in a rejection of the null hypothesis. The ACAT I data are 
presented in Figures 38-39, and Table 24. 
 
Figure 38: Histogram ERAM 1.0 and 3.0 ACAT I DT&E Time 
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Figure 39: CDFs of ERAM 1.0 and ERAM 3.0 ACAT I DT&E Time 
Table 24: ERAM 1.0 and 3.0 ACAT I DT&E Statistics 
Exit at MS C ERAM 1.0 ERAM 3.0 % Difference 
Mean (days) 259.21 1295.05 399.61 
Standard Error 3.68 8.14 121.28 
Median (days) 223.86 1263.55 464.43 
Standard Deviation (days) 149.94 331.79 121.28 
Sample Variance 22482.66 110086.85 389.65 
Kurtosis 5.45 0.61 -88.76 
Skewness 1.96 0.57 -70.69 
Range (days) 1133.55 2389.97 110.84 
Minimum (days) 36.97 511.30 1282.93 
Maximum (days) 1170.52 2901.27 147.86 
Program Count  1660.00 1660.00 0.00 
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The KS test results in a maximum deviation 0.1085 with a critical KS statistic of 
0.0472 and the null was rejected. The ACAT II analysis is presented in Figures 40-41, 
and Table 25. 
 
Figure 40: Histogram ERAM 1.0 and 3.0 ACAT II DT&E Time 
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Figure 41: CDFs of ERAM 1.0 and ERAM 3.0 ACAT II DT&E Time 
Table 25: ERAM 1.0 and 3.0 ACAT II DT&E Statistics 
Exit at MS C ERAM 1.0 ERAM 3.0 % Difference 
Mean (days) 238.64 620.90 160.18 
Standard Error 4.82 5.00 3.69 
Median (days) 197.31 603.86 206.05 
Standard Deviation (days) 148.24 153.72 3.69 
Sample Variance 21974.91 23628.85 7.53 
Kurtosis 4.21 1.75 -58.35 
Skewness 1.82 0.90 -50.79 
Range (days) 965.23 1166.29 20.83 
Minimum (days) 47.07 258.23 448.65 
Maximum (days) 1012.30 1424.52 40.72 
Program Count  944.00 944.00 0.00 
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The null was rejected based on a calculated KS statistic of 0.0626 and a critical 
statistic of 0.1342. Figure 42-43 and Table 26 are the results of the ACAT III analysis.  
 
Figure 42: Histogram ERAM 1.0 and 3.0 ACAT III DT&E Time 
 
Figure 43: CDFs of ERAM 1.0 and ERAM 3.0 ACAT III DT&E Time 
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Table 26: ERAM 1.0 and 3.0 ACAT III DT&E Statistics 
Exit at MS C ERAM 1.0 ERAM 3.0 % Difference 
Mean (days) 204.58 534.97 161.49 
Standard Error 2.10 2.08 -0.81 
Median (days) 174.78 518.19 196.47 
Standard Deviation (days) 138.54 137.42 -0.81 
Sample Variance 19193.29 18883.33 -1.61 
Kurtosis 6.96 1.27 -81.78 
Skewness 2.01 0.79 -60.62 
Range (days) 1403.63 1100.31 -21.61 
Minimum (days) 32.34 212.87 558.34 
Maximum (days) 1435.97 1313.18 -8.55 
Program Count  4363.00 4363.00 0.00 
 
The absolute maximum deviation between the CDFs was 0.1442. This value was 
larger than the critical KS statistic of 0.0291 and the null hypothesis was rejected. A 
summary of the differences between the model’s descriptive statistics between ERAM 
1.0 and 3.0 is provided in Table 27.  
Table 27: Summary of Percent Differences Between ERAM 1.0 and ERAM 3.0 
Exit at MS C 
All ACAT ACAT I ACAT II ACAT III 
% Difference % Difference % Difference % Difference 
Mean (days) 227 400 160 161 
Standard Error 162 121 4 -1 
Median (days) 213 464 206 196 
Standard Deviation (days) 162 121 4 -1 
Sample Variance 586 390 8 -2 
Kurtosis -60 -89 -58 -82 
Skewness -17 -71 -51 -61 
Range (days) 103 111 21 -22 
Minimum (days) 558 1283 449 558 
Maximum (days) 113 148 41 -9 
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A summary of the KS Test results is presented in Table 28 indicating that the 
ERAM 1.0 and 3.0 are different with respect to all ACAT groupings.  
Table 28: KS Test Results Summary 
ACAT Group KS Test Result 
All Reject Ho 
I Reject Ho 
II Reject Ho 
III Reject Ho 
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Appendix H: Additional Intervention Results Analysis 
Table 29: TRR Intervention Results 
Exit at MS C Baseline Intervention % Difference 
Mean (days) 4237 4243 0 
Standard Error 201 21 0 
Median (days) 3953 3945 0 
Standard Deviation (days) 1693 1699 0 
Sample Variance 2867719 2885263 1 
Kurtosis 0.47 0.45 -4 
Skewness 0.92 0.92 0 
Range (days) 9189 9134 -1 
Minimum (days) 1344 1320 -2 
Maximum (days) 10534 10455 -1 
Program Count  6582 6592 0 
 
Table 30: SVR Intervention Results 
Exit at MS C Baseline Intervention % Difference 
Mean (days) 4237 4233 0 
Standard Error 21 21 0 
Median (days) 3953 3932 -1 
Standard Deviation (days) 1693 1695 0 
Sample Variance 2867719 2874276 0 
Kurtosis 0.47 0.44 -8 
Skewness 0.92 0.91 -1 
Range (days) 9189 9134 -1 
Minimum (days) 1345 1320 -2 
Maximum (days) 10534 10455 -1 
Program Count  6582 6594 0 
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Table 31: RTO Test Resource Availability Intervention Results 
Exit at MS C Baseline Intervention % Difference 
Mean (days) 4237 4247 0 
Standard Error 21 21 0 
Median (days) 3953 3952 0 
Standard Deviation (days) 1693 1697 0 
Sample Variance 2867719 2881313 0 
Kurtosis 0.47 0.43 -9 
Skewness 0.92 0.91 -1 
Range (days) 9189 9005 -2 
Minimum (days) 1345 1345 0 
Maximum (days) 10534 10350 -2 
 
Table 32: 110% Additional Test Missions Intervention Results 
Exit at MS C Baseline Intervention % Difference 
Mean (days) 4237 4284 1 
Standard Error 21 21 1 
Median (days) 3953 3991 1 
Standard Deviation (days) 1693 1715 1 
Sample Variance 2867719 2941144 3 
Kurtosis 0.47 0.49 5 
Skewness 0.92 0.93 2 
Range (days) 9189 9259 1 
Minimum (days) 1345 1391 3 
Maximum (days) 10534 10650 1 
Program Count  6582 6596 0 
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Table 33: 115% Additional Test Missions Intervention Results 
Exit at MS C Baseline Intervention % Difference 
Mean (days) 4237 4306 2 
Standard Error 21 21 2 
Median (days) 3953 4019 2 
Standard Deviation (days) 1693 1726 2 
Sample Variance 2867719 2980340 4 
Kurtosis 0 1 15 
Skewness 1 1 2 
Range (days) 9189 9617 5 
Minimum (days) 1345 1371 2 
Maximum (days) 10534 10987 4 
Program Count  6582 6604 0 
 
Table 34: 45 Day Maximum Delay to Execution of First Test Mission Results 
Exit at MS C Baseline Intervention % Difference 
Mean (days) 4237 4148 -2 
Standard Error 21 21 0 
Median (days) 3953 3855 -2 
Standard Deviation (days) 1693 1689 0 
Sample Variance 2867719 2854192 0 
Kurtosis 0.47 0.44 -6 
Skewness 0.92 0.91 0 
Range (days) 9189 9148 0 
Minimum (days) 1345 1343 0 
Maximum (days) 10534 10491 0 
Program Count  6582 6574 0 
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Table 35: 182.5 Day Maximum Delay to Execution of First Test Mission Results 
Exit at MS C Baseline Intervention % Difference 
Mean (days) 4237 4185 -1 
Standard Error 21 21 0 
Median (days) 3953 3900 -1 
Standard Deviation (days) 1693 1688 0 
Sample Variance 2867719 2850115 -1 
Kurtosis 0.47 0.47 0 
Skewness 0.92 0.91 0 
Range (days) 9189 9634 5 
Minimum (days) 1345 1290 -4 
Maximum (days) 10534 10924 4 
Program Count  6582 6601 0 
 
Table 36: 100% Decrease Test Mission Deficiencies Intervention Results 
Exit at MS C  Baseline Intervention % Difference 
Mean (days) 4237 4134 -2 
Standard Error 21 20 -2 
Median (days) 3953 3836 -3 
Standard Deviation (days) 1693 1655 -2 
Sample Variance 2867719 2737611 -5 
Kurtosis 0.47 0.30 -36 
Skewness 0.92 0.87 -5 
Range (days) 9189 8915 -3 
Minimum (days) 1345 1281 -5 
Maximum (days) 10534 10196 -3 
Program Count  6582 6574 0 
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Table 37: 50% Decrease Test Mission Deficiencies Intervention Results 
Exit at MS C Baseline Intervention % Difference 
Mean (days) 4237 4183 -1 
Standard Error 21 21 -2 
Median (days) 3953 3885 -2 
Standard Deviation (days) 1693 1668 -2 
Sample Variance 2867719 2781795 -3 
Kurtosis 0.47 0.4 -14 
Skewness 0.92 0.9 -2 
Range (days) 9189 9012 -2 
Minimum (days) 1345 1263 -6 
Maximum (days) 10534 10275 -2 
Program Count  6582 6587 0 
 
Table 38: 37.5% Decrease Test Mission Deficiencies Intervention Results 
Exit at MS C Baseline Intervention  % Difference 
Mean (days) 4237 4195 -1 
Standard Error 21 21 -1 
Median 3953 3895 -1 
Standard Deviation (days) 1693 1673 -1 
Sample Variance 2867719 2800061 -2 
Kurtosis 0.47 0 -14 
Skewness 0.92 1 -2 
Range (days) 9189 9077 -1 
Minimum (days) 1345 1354 1 
Maximum (days) 10534 10430 -1 
Count 6582 6608 0 
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Table 39: Increase Test Item Quantity Intervention Results 
Exit at MS C Baseline Intervention % Difference 
Mean (days) 4237 3654 -14 
Standard Error 21 19 -10 
Median (days) 3953 3318 -16 
Standard Deviation (days) 1693 1519 -10 
Sample Variance 2867719 2306163 -20 
Kurtosis 0.47 -0.17 -135 
Skewness 0.92 0.75 -18 
Range (days) 9189 7812 -15 
Minimum (days) 1345 1137 -15 
Maximum (days) 10534 8949 -15 
Program Count  6582 6604 0 
 
Table 40: Aggregate Intervention Results 
Exit at MS C 
 
Baseline Intervention % Difference 
Mean (days) 4237 3613 -15 
Standard Error 21 19 -11 
Median (days) 3953 3280 -17 
Standard Deviation (days) 1693 1517 -10 
Sample Variance 2867719 2300524 -20 
Kurtosis 0.47 -0.17 -135.88 
Skewness 0.92 0.75 -18.34 
Range (days) 9189 8232 -10 
Minimum (days) 1345 1113 -17 
Maximum (days) 10534 9345 -11 
Program Count  6582 6603 0 
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Appendix I: Research Methodology 
 
Figure 44: Methodology for a Simulation Study (Law, 2007: 67) 
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